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Federalism in the Era of International
Standards: Federal and State Government
Regulation of Merchant Vessels in the United
States (Part I)*
CRAIG H. ALLEN**
I
INTRODUCTION
For more than fifty years the United States has played a leading role in
efforts at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop,
implement, and enforce an effective mandatory international legal regime
designed to promote merchant vessel safety and prevent marine pollution by
vessels. Those visionary efforts by the United States and other IMO-member
nations have produced a vast body of international conventions, protocols,
safety codes, and guidance documents which now constitute the generally-
accepted international rules and standards with which all merchant vessels
must comply. The United States is a party to nearly all of the IMO-sponsored
marine safety and pollution prevention conventions and has incorporated
most of the rules and standards promulgated by those conventions into its
domestic law applicable to United States-flag vessels. In addition, the United
States has launched a far-reaching Port State Control Initiative to ensure that
foreign vessels entering United States ports or waterways (other than those
in innocent or transit passage) comply with the international rules and
standards. The United States' decision to adopt and enforce international
standards-and to permit foreign vessels complying with international
standards to enter United States ports-has not, however, been followed by
all of the states within the nation, some of which have enacted local
requirements which differ from international standards.
The effect of state initiatives to step-up regulation of merchant vessels
entering state waters has recently emerged as a foreign relations challenge
* Editor's Note: This is the first part of a multi-part article. Part II will appear in the October 1998
issue of the Journal.
** Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Law and Marine Affairs, University of Washington
(Seattle). J.D., University of Washington.
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for the United States. For example, actions by the State of Washington to
prescribe state-specific requirements applicable to foreign merchant vessels
navigating in state waters have so far drawn diplomatic protests from
fourteen nations and the Commission of the European Community.' The
protest by the EC nations warns that differing regimes in different parts of
the United States create uncertainty and confusion and set an "unwelcome
precedent" for other federally administered nations.2 A 1997 Canadian
Government protest bluntly declares that Washington's actions violate an
international agreement between the United States and Canada which
provides reciprocal transit privileges to vessels navigating the boundary
straits between Washington and the Province of British Columbia. 3 Yet, in
a recent decision turning aside a challenge to the new Washington tanker
regulations, the federal district court held that the regulations did not intrude
on the federal government's Foreign Relations Clause or Commerce Clause
powers.4 Nor, the court held, were the state regulations preempted or
superseded by any of the numerous federal laws and international agree-
ments which regulate those same vessels. 5 While the United States Attorney
General was considering whether to petition the circuit court of appeals for
leave to intervene in the case on appeal, the governor of Washington wrote
directly to President Clinton, urging him to direct the Attorney General to
remain on the sidelines. 6 Despite this request, the United States intervened
in the appeal, citing in its brief "the immense foreign affairs interests of the
United States in the international maritime field."'7
International conflict over maritime boundaries and other affairs is
nothing new in the Pacific Northwest. In 1859, British and American forces
stood on the brink of war over a border dispute involving the same boundary
straits implicated in the 1997 protest by the Canadian Government. 8 The two
IThe protesting nations include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. See Note Verbale, Royal Danish
Embassy, June 14, 1996 (File No. 60.USA.I/4) (copy on file with the author).2 1d. See also Brief for Intervenor-Appellant United States, International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker
Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, at 45-46 (9th Cir. No. 97-35010).3Canadian Embassy, Note No. 0389 (May 7, 1997) (copy on file with the author).4 See International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484,
1497-99, 1997 AMC 512 (W.D. Wash. 1996), appeal docketed sub. nom. International Ass'n of Indep.
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke (9th Cir. No. 97-35010). The Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments
on the appeal on February 4, 1998. The issues in the suit are analyzed by one of the amici curiae attorneys
in Coleman, Federal Preemption of State "BAP" Laws: Repelling State Borders in the Interest of
Uniformity, 9 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 305 (1997).
51ntertanko, 947 F. Supp. at 1493-97.6 Letter from Gary Locke, Governor of Washington, to President Bill Clinton (Mar. 24, 1997) (copy
on file with the author).7 Brief for Intervenor-Appellant United States, supra note 2, at 2.
8The near-war over the San Juan Islands is described in K. Murray, The Pig War (1968).
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governments have yet to settle maritime boundary disputes over the waters
of the Strait of Juan de Fuca between Oregon and British Columbia and in
the Dixon Entrance between British Columbia and Alaska. 9 Disputes over
fishery resources-particularly over northwest salmon stocks-are com-
mon, and frequently rancorous. In 1995, the United States Congress
condemned, as a violation of international law, a Canadian government
decision to impose a fee on United States fishing vessels transiting the
Canadian waters of the Inside Passage between Washington and Alaska.'0
The Canadian transit fee was designed to bring pressure on the United States
to more earnestly negotiate a new salmon treaty for the region. The 1995
Congressional response sounded ominously close to a threat to use force to
protect United States vessels if Canada further interfered with their "right"
of innocent passage through the waters of the Inside Passage." In the
summer of 1997 Congress renewed the threat. In response to protest actions
by Canadian fishing vessel operators who blockaded the State of Alaska
ferry Malaspina during her port call in a Canadian harbor, the United States
Senate resolved to call on the President to dispatch United States "assets and
personnel" to Canadian waters to protect the "right of innocent passage" of
United States citizens through the Canadian territorial sea. 12 The Senate
further called on the President to impose retaliatory trade sanctions on
Canada and to require all Canadian vessels anchoring in United States
waters to submit to United States Customs inspections.' 3 Throughout the
fray, the governors of Washington and Alaska carried on their own
diplomatic efforts with the Canadian fisheries minister in an attempt to
resolve the salmon dispute. 14 Maritime affairs in the Northwest are plainly
international affairs; affairs which raise fundamental federalism questions
for the nation.
In examining federalism issues relevant to merchant vessels, this article
will distinguish between those laws and regulations governing liability for
harm l5 and those which regulate safety. 16 Federalism questions arise most
9Maritime Affairs: A World Handbook 208-09 (H. Degenhardt et al. eds. 1985).
'
0Fisheries Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-43, tit. IV, § 401(l)-(3), 109 Stat. 366 (1995).
''See id. § 401(10)-(12).
12See S. Res. 109, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997), and 143 Cong. Rec. S7919 (daily ed. July 23, 1997).
13See 143 Cong. Rec. at S7966 (daily ed. July 23, 1997).
"'See, e.g., Talks May Ease Canada-U.S. Fishing Dispute-Northwest Officials, B.C. Minister to
Meet, Seattle Times, July 30, 1997, at B3.
15Liability laws include those laws establishing: (1) the bases for liability and any relevant defenses,
and, (2) the remedies available. Liability laws derive from legislative or judicial judgments as to the
circumstances in which liability will be imposed and the measure of damages. Liability regimes
necessarily entail a judgment about the extent to which accident costs should be internalized.
16Each regime presents a distinct but related approach to addressing the social costs of accidents. As
one commentator has observed:
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frequently in the former, private, maritime law domain, when courts are
called upon to determine judicial jurisdiction and the extent to which state
law may be applied to adjudicate liability and damages in cases falling
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Less frequently, the feder-
alism debate focuses on public maritime law, when states seek to regulate
commercial vessel safety or vessel-source pollution.
Federalism in the private maritime law context has been extensively
analyzed in several recent articles. 17 Those works point to an unmistakable
erosion in the principle of uniformity in private admiralty law in recent
Supreme Court decisions. Without questioning the wisdom of the Court's
private maritime law decisions,' 8 this article will focus on the body of
public, "foreign relations laws"'19 applicable to vessels entering United
States waters, to determine the extent to which those laws may supersede
state law or preempt state authority to regulate the conduct of merchant
vessels.
This article will begin with an examination of the constitutional allocation
of federal and state powers relevant to regulation of merchant vessel safety
and vessel-source pollution prevention. Next, it describes the constitutional
limitations on the states' exercise of their police powers, focusing on the
"dormant" Commerce Clause doctrine and the Court's preemption and
supersession jurisprudence. The article will then examine the principal
international conventions and related United States statutes which make up
the foreign relations law of the United States that will typically be relevant
in a preemption analysis of state merchant vessel safety and pollution
prevention laws and regulations. Finally, the article will identify weaknesses
Liability in tort and the regulation of safety represent two very different approaches for controlling
activities that create risks of harm to others. Tort liability is private in nature and works not by
social command but rather indirectly, through the deterrent effect of damage actions that may be
brought once harm occurs. Standards, prohibitions and other forms of safety regulation, in contrast,
are public in character and modify behavior in an immediate way through requirements that are
imposed before, or at least independently of, the actual occurrence of harm.
Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357, 357 (1984).
17The leading articles on the subject are: Friedell, Searching for a Compass: Federal and State Law
Making Authority in Admiralty, 57 La. L. Rev. 825 (1997); Force, Post-Calhoun Remedies for Death and
Injury in Maritime Cases: Uniformity, Whither Goest Thou?, 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 7 (1996); Robertson,
Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 325 (1995). See also Currie,
Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 158.
18For the critical comments of two prominent federal admiralty judges, see Haight, Babel Afloat:
Some Reflections on Uniformity in Maritime Law, 28 J. Mar. L. & Com. 189 (1997), and Hughes, An
Introduction: Principles and Pragmatism, 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1 (1996).
19"Foreign relations law" includes: (1) international law as it applied to the United States, and, (2)
domestic law that has substantial significance for the foreign relations of the United States or has other
substantial international consequences. See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 1 (1987). "Public" law (sometimes described as laws governing "primary conduct") is about
legislative competence to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce laws to effect safety goals.
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in the current approach to analyzing preemption challenges, propose a new
approach and apply the new approach to issues raised by state regulation of
merchant vessel -construction, design, equipment, or manning, merchant
vessel operations, and vessel-source polluting discharges or emissions.
II
ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY TO REGULATE MERCHANT
VESSEL SAFETY AND POLLUTION PREVENTION
Early advocates debating how best to allocate authority between the
federal and state governments under the proposed Constitution recognized
the pervasive national interest in foreign affairs and commerce. Writing in
The Federalist No. 11, Alexander Hamilton highlighted the importance to
the new nation of a strong navy and merchant marine and the pivotal role
that a "vigorous national government" would play in promoting them.20 In
justifying the constitutional limitations on the states in matters affecting
foreign affairs, James Madison cited "the advantage of uniformity in all
points which relate to foreign powers."'21 John Jay, who had served as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the Articles of Confederation period,
observed that "there are few who will not admit that the affairs of trade and
navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily
pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and
be made to promote it.''22 Not surprisingly, the Constitution the Federalist-
dominated Founders drafted allocated the nation's foreign affairs and
foreign and interstate commerce powers to the national government.
Nevertheless, persistent federalism questions relating to maritime commerce
have divided the Republic since its birth, as incisively framed by Chief
Justice Marshall's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden.23 Regrettably, there is still
little agreement about the constitutionally proper federal and state roles in
regulating merchant vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. To
understand this ongoing conflict-and to find our way out of the dissipating
jurisdictional struggles it engenders-we must begin with an analysis of the
federal Commerce Clause and Foreign Relations powers, the federal
Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction, the nature of the states' reserved
powers, and the Supremacy Clause and its offspring, the preemption
doctrine.
2 0The Federalist No. II (Alexander Hamilton).
2 lThe Federalist No. 44 (James Madison).22The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay).
2322 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding that New York's steamboat "monopoly" was preempted by
a federal vessel licensing statute).
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A. Federal Authority Over Merchant Vessel Safety and Pollution
Prevention
The federal government is widely understood to be one of limited express
powers. 24 Congress has no inherent legislative power; it can legislate only
with respect to those subjects over which it has expressly been given
jurisdiction by the Constitution. The most frequently cited constitutional
bases for federal maritime legislation are the Commerce Clause, the
Admiralty Clause and, more recently, the Foreign Affairs Clause. The
authority granted to the federal government by those sources, together with
the gloss added by the Necessary and Proper Clause, 25 is so broad that it now
seems unthinkable that a court would find that an act of federal legislation
governing maritime commerce was enacted without jurisdiction. 26 The
authority of the Executive Branch and the federal judiciary in matters of
maritime commerce is similarly broad.
1. The Federal Interstate and Foreign Commerce Power
The Constitution allocates to the federal government the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.2 7 The
Commerce Clause provides authority for the federal government to regulate
not only the commerce itself,28 but also the highways of commerce,
including the navigable waterways; 29 the instrumentalities of commerce,
24 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1990) (quoting The Federalist No. 45).
25 U.5. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)
("[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.").
26See D. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 136-47 (1970) [hereinafter Admiralty and Federal-
ism]. Other constitutional provisions may, however, limit the federal government. See, e.g., U.S. Const.
art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.") and cl. 6 ("No
preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those
of another: nor shall vessels bound to, or from, one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in
another.").
27U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28The Constitution itself places few express limits on the federal commerce power. See Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (holding that "[tlhe court must defer
to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce if there is any rational
basis for such a finding."). Later, however, the Supreme Court limited the federal commerce power in two
respects. First, the Court held that the Congress' Commerce Clause powers over matters "affecting"
commerce are not unlimited. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) ("the powers delegated
by the... Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
state governments are numerous and undefined.") (quoting The Federalist No. 45). Second, the Court
held that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to conscript the states into implementing
federal law. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).29 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871) (upholding application of federal steamboat
Vol. 29, No. 3
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including commercial vessels;30 and activities which, though facially intra-
state, may "affect" interstate or foreign commerce. 3'
Legislative power over commerce is concurrent in many respects with the
state police power. 32 However, the states' role in regulating foreign
commerce is restricted. Foreign commerce is preeminently a matter of
national concern. 33 Owing to the need for the nation to speak with "one
voice" in its foreign commercial relations,34 the Supreme Court has
characterized Congress' power over foreign commerce as "exclusive and
absolute. '35 The Tenth Amendment does not limit the federal government's
foreign commerce powers.36 In its analyses of state taxation of instrumen-
talities engaged in foreign commerce, the Court has expressed particular
concern for oceangoing traffic. 37 The Court has, in fact, articulated a
presumption that such vessels will be regulated by the federal government. 38
The Court's concern over the effect of state taxation of instrumentalities of
foreign commerce focuses on the potential for frustration of federal
uniformity and the possibility of retaliation by aggrieved nations. 39
inspection laws to vessels plying the navigable waters of the United States within the boundaries of a
single state), and Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866) (holding that the
commerce power includes the power to regulate navigable waters). Federal statutes and regulations
governing the navigable waters of the United States are contained in Title 33 of the United States Code
and the Code of Federal Regulations.30See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (holding that the power to legislate
commerce includes competence to regulate vessels as instrumentalities of commerce).
31See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill (1942). Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61 (distinguishing
Wickard as a case involving interstate "economic activity").
32Congress does not possess a police power, as do the states; however, "in the exercise of its control
over interstate commerce, the means employed by Congress may have the quality of police regulations."
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1937).33See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448, 1979 AMC 881 (1979).
Although the Constitution grants Congress power to regulate commerce "with foreign Nations" and
"among the several States" in parallel phrases, "there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope
of the foreign commerce power to be greater." Id. at 448 (citing, inter alia, The Federalist No. 42).34See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 286 (1976).351d. See also Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1904).
36See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 n. 13 ("It has never been suggested that Congress' power to regulate
foreign commerce would be limited" by the Court's holding in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976)).37See id. at 449.
38See id. ("vehicles of commerce by water being instruments of intercommunication with other
nations, the regulation of them is assumed by national legislation.") (quoting Railroad Co. v. Maryland,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 470 (1875)).39See id. at 450.
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2. The Federal Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Power
The Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to "all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. '40 Together with the Necessary
and Proper Clause, the Admiralty Clause provides the constitutional author-
ity for federal courts and the Congress to create and modify a body of federal
maritime law for the nation. 4' The general maritime law, received by the
United States and developed by the federal courts, is "federal" law, and
therefore prevails over any contrary state law by virtue of Article VI of the
Constitution. 42 As with its power under the Commerce Clause, Congress has
the power under the Admiralty Clause to preempt the entire field of maritime
law; 4 3 but Congress has not done so.44 As a result, state law may serve an
important role in admiralty, occasionally providing the rule of decision
governing remedies 45 and, perhaps, liability.46
Congress has largely left development of admiralty law to the courts. 47
4°U.S. Const. art. 111, § 2.4 1See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61, 1959 AMC 832
(1959) (the Admiralty Clause "empower[s] the federal courts... to draw on the substantive law 'inherent
in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' . . . and to continue the development of this law within
constitutional limits.") (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55, 1932 AMC 355 (1932)); A.
Ehrenzweig, Private International Law 40-41 (1967); Admiralty and Federalism, supra note 26, at
142-44 & n.42 (observing that the Admiralty Clause, coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause, is
the principal basis for Congress to legislate admiralty law); Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative
Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1214 (1954).42See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739, 1961 AMC 833 (1961); Currie, supra note 17,
at 166 ("even when there is no maritime rule, the Admiralty Clause itself has a preemptive, negative
effect on state law similar to that of the Commerce Clause."). In his famous dissent in Jensen, Justice
Holmes disagreed. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220-23, 1996 AMC 2076 (1917)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("it is too late to say that mere silence of Congress excludes the statute or
common law of a state from supplementing the wholly inadequate maritime law.").43See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407,434-35 (1976)
(Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
4Congress also has the power to make judicial jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases
exclusively federal, but has elected instead to confer concurrent jurisdiction over in personam admiralty
cases on state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) and The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867)
(holding that the saving to suitors clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 does not permit in rem actions to be brought
in state court).45See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 1996 AMC 305 (1996) (holding
that a state wrongful death statute was not preempted in a suit to recover for the death of a recreational
boater in the territorial sea).46Cf. id. at 216 n.14 (intimating that in a proper case state law may provide the rule of decision
governing liability). But see Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893) (holding that the federal rules of
navigation preempt state law). Judge Haight notes that the maritime personal injury bench and bar has
found the passage in Yamaha astonishing. Haight, supra note 18, at 201-02. The Court's inconsistency
in its choice of law analysis is analyzed in Friedell, supra note 17, at 828-32.47See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20, 1963 AMC 1093 (1963). But see Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27, 1991 AMC 1 (1990) (holding that "Congress retains superior
authority in these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered
boundaries imposed by federal legislation.").
Vol. 29, No. 3
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Beginning with the writings of Justice Joseph Story48 at the turn of the 19th
Century, Federalist thinking shaped the early development of the admiralty
and maritime jurisprudence. Recognizing the far-reaching international
implications of admiralty law in the United States, Justice Story concluded
that "the admiralty jurisdiction naturally connects itself, on the one hand,
with our diplomatic relations and duties to foreign nations, and their
subjects; and, on the other hand, with the great interests of navigation and
commerce, foreign and domestic. ''49 Judicial recognition of the primacy of
the federal interest in development of the admiralty law reached its zenith
shortly after the turn of the 20th Century, when the Supreme Court, in
response to state initiatives to provide greater protection to maritime
workers, struck down state laws (and a revised federal "saving to suitors"
clause in the admiralty jurisdiction statute) which the Court concluded
would work "material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law or interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that
law in its international and interstate relations. '50
It is often said that-outside of the admiralty jurisdiction-federal law is
interstitial,51 filling actual or perceived gaps in state statutory and common
law. 52 Within the admiralty jurisdiction, however, it is state law-not federal
law-which has historically been viewed as interstitial. 53 Admiralty draws
on the ancient general maritime law, as modified by the Congress or the
federal courts. Over a half-century ago the Supreme Court identified a
"reverse-Erie" doctrine, 54 which acts to displace application of state law in
48See, e.g., De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 1997 AMC 550 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776), and
J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 1657-1667 (1833).49 Story, supra note 48, at § 1666 (quoting Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 335
(1816)). See also id. at § 1664.
5 0Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216, 1996 AMC 2076 (1917) (holding that New York
State's workers' compensation statute could not be applied to a longshoreman whose injury claim fell
within admiralty jurisdiction). See also Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1920),
and Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-28, 1924 AMC 403 (1924).5 1P. Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 533 (3d ed. 1988)
("Federal law is generally interstitial in nature. It rarely occupies a legal field completely.").52As Professors Hart and Wechsler have observed, on the whole federal legislation
has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It builds upon
legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary
for the special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against the background of the total corpus juris of
the states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the background of the common law,
assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.
Id. 53G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 1-17, at 49 (2d ed. 1975). But see Jensen, 244
U.S. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The maritime law is not a corpus juris-it is a very limited body
of customs and ordinances of the sea.").54Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223, 1986 AMC 2113 (1986) ("the 'saving to
suitors' clause allows state courts to entertain in personam maritime causes of action, but in such cases
the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called
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matters falling within federal admiralty jurisdiction but heard in state courts
under the saving to suitors clause.55 Indeed, some have argued in favor of a
presumption that state law is displaced in cases falling within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction.56 But such a presumption is unlikely to garner
much support among the current members of the Court, who seem unwilling
even to reconcile the Court's recent decisions with a body of well-
established precedents. 57 The trend in Supreme Court decisions now points
toward much greater diversity in choice of law in private admiralty cases.
The long-held article of faith among the admiralty bar that "with admiralty
jurisdiction comes application of substantive admiralty law," 58 would find at
best an agnostic reception among a majority of the current Supreme
Court59-at least unless that phrase "substantive admiralty law" subsumes
'reverse-Erie' doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to
governing federal maritime standards.") (citing Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245,
1942 AMC 1645 (1942)). See also Robertson, The Applicability of State Law in Maritime Cases After
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 81 (1996).
5528 U.S.C. § 1333(l).
56See, e.g., Peltz, The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 103, 130 (1996)
("unlike Commerce Clause analysis, the preemption test under the Admiralty Clause should start with the
proposition that there is a presumption in favor of preemption as to all matters falling within admiralty
jurisdiction.").57See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 210 n.8, 1996 AMC 305 (1996) ("[w]e
attempt no grand synthesis or reconciliation of our precedents today"), and American Dredging Co. v.
Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452, 1994 AMC 913 (1994) ("[it would be idle to pretend that the line separating
permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or
indeed is even entirely consistent within our admiralty jurisprudence.").
58East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864, 1986 AMC 2027 (1986).
In construing the Admiralty Clause, the Supreme Court concluded that
[o]ne thing . . . is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law
coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been
the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the
several states, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution
aimed....
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575, 1996 AMC 2372 (1875).59See, e.g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 545-46, 1995
AMC 913 (1995), stating in dictum that the
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction does not result in automatic displacement of state law. It is true
that "with admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law." But to
characterize that law ... as "federal rules of decision" is a destructive oversimplification of the
highly intricate interplay of the States and the National Government in their regulation of maritime
commerce. It is true that state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when
this Court finds inroads into a harmonious system. But this limitation still leaves the States a wide
scope.
(citations omitted). See also Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 206-16 & nn.8 & 13. The retreat from uniformity was
first signaled in Wilbur Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 1955 AMC 467 (1955)
(holding that, although marine insurance contracts fall within admiralty jurisdiction, state law governs in
the absence of a judicially established admiralty rule governing the question or a need to fashion a federal
rule). For a comparison with Canadian law, which remains faithful to the principle of uniformity in the
maritime law, see Ordon Estate v. Grail, 1997 AMC 418, 433-35 (Ontario C.A. 1996).
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an as yet undefined quantum of state law. It thus now appears that if
uniformity is to continue to be a characteristic feature of private maritime
law, it will be Congress, not the Supreme Court, who will be the author of
the doctrine.60
3. The Federal Foreign Affairs Powers
The Founders considered the prudent exercise of foreign affairs powers
critical to the nation's success. 61 The unhappy experience under the Articles
of Confederation revealed that states had so often violated the nation's
international law obligations that the files of Congress "contain complaints
already, from almost every nation with which treaties have been formed." 62
In enumerating the defects in the Articles, Edmund Randolph's first
complaint was that under the Articles the national government "could not
cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations to be punished." 63 The
Constitution the Founders drafted plainly sought to correct the weaknesses
in the Articles' failed scheme for the conduct of foreign affairs. It did so by
lodging the foreign affairs powers of the United States solely in the federal
government. 64 Indeed, as a "federal state," the United States constitutes a
single entity in the eyes of international law. 65 Power over external relations
is not shared with the states, 66 and will not likely be shared in the future. 67
6°Some might conclude that the federal bench has become frozen in the headlights of Erie, reticent
to further develop a body of judge-made or judge-declared federal law-even in admiralty cases, where
Erie is irrelevant. Cf. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?, 24 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 249 (1993), and Kimball, Miles: "This Much and No More...", 25 J. Mar. L. & Com. 319 (1994)
("instead of acknowledging the Court's constitutional function of declaring the admiralty and maritime
law and ensuring uniformity in that body of law, the [Miles] opinion relegates the Court to an inferior
role to that of Congress.").
61See The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay) ("The power of making treaties is an important one, especially
as it relates to war, peace, and commerce.").62June 19, 1787 Statement by James Madison to Committee of the Whole, reprinted in J. Madison,
Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 142 (Ohio Univ. Press ed. 1966). See also Story,
supra note 48, at § 1054 (The Continental "Congress, indeed, possessed the power of making treaties; but
the inability of the federal government to enforce them had become so apparent, as to render that power
in a great degree useless.").63Madison, supra note 62, at 28.
64Restatement, supra note 19, at § 201 cmt. g & n.9.65See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 2, 49 Stat. 3097,
T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
66See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Restatement, supra
note 19, at § 1 n.5. See generally Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J.
Int'l L. 821 (1989), and Fenton, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign
Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 563, 564 n.1 (1986) (summarizing state and local
government regulations directed at foreign affairs interests).6 7L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 149-50 (1996) [hereinafter cited as Foreign
Affairs] ("[rievolution in the national mood in the 1990s has tended to seek to take from the federal
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Nor does the Tenth Amendment limit the federal government's foreign
affairs powers. 6 8
The Constitution ensures the primacy of the federal government in the
nation's foreign relations through two provisions. 69 It first provides that only
the President shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties.70 Article VI of the Constitution then provides that
such treaties (and the Constitution and the Laws of the United States) are the
supreme "Law of the Land,"' and prevail over, or preempt, state and local
enactments. This supremacy of the federal government's power over foreign
affairs has been given "continuous recognition" by the Supreme Court.72
Each of the branches of the federal government plays an important role in
the development of conventional international law governing merchant
shipping.7 3 The President participates in the development of international
conventions establishing vessel safety and pollution prevention rules and
standards and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, binds the nation to
those conventions by ratification or accession followed by proclamation. 74
The President may, with the Senate's consent, enter into bilateral treaties of
government and give to the states, but this trend is not likely to have [an] impact on foreign affairs.").
As Madison argued, the constitutional limitation on the states' role in foreign affairs is justified by the
need for "immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be
responsible." The Federalist No. 44 (James Madison).681n reserving powers to the states or to the people, the Tenth Amendment refers only to those
"powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution." The foreign relations powers are
delegated solely to the federal government. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-35 (1920)
(Holmes, J.) (dictum). Federal legislation which would have subordinated the federal foreign affairs
power to the Tenth Amendment was considered by the Congress in 1953, but failed to pass. See S.J. Res.
1, 83d Cong. (1953), 99 Cong. Rec. 6777 (1953) (the proposed "Bricker Amendment").691n 1936 the Supreme Court examined the constitutional basis for the federal foreign relations power
and its roots in the inherent sovereign nature of the nation-state and concluded that "the investment of
the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend on the affirmative grants
of the Constitution." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (dictum).
The Court's decision is criticized in Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 Yale L.J. 467 (1946).70U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. States, by contrast, are expressly precluded from entering into treaties.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
7 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.72Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (citations omitted). The Court elaborated on the
doctrine in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), holding that the preemption analysis turns on
three factors: 1) the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme; 2) whether the need for national
uniformity necessitates that the federal government occupy the field; and, 3) the danger of a conflict
between the federal program and the state laws under examination. Id. at 502-05.73
"Conventional" international law includes all international agreements to which a State is party.
Conventional international law is generally binding only on States-parties. See Restatement, supra note
19, at §§ 102(3) & 301.74The United States is represented at the IMO by delegates from the Department of State, the Coast
Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Department of Defense. See Brief
for Intervenor-Appellant United States, supra note 2, at 12.
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"friendship, commerce and navigation" to facilitate trade with other nations.
Conventions and treaties may be self-executing, requiring no domestic
legislation or regulations to implement them. Where a treaty is not
self-executing, Congress must first implement its terms before the treaty
becomes a part of United States domestic law. In such cases Congress may
draw legislative authority from the treaty itself.75 The President may also
enter into Executive Agreements with other nations.76 Such international
agreements, often representing a presidential quid pro quo, 77 bind the nation
even without Senate advice and consent.78 Executive Agreements may be
grounded on congressional consent,79 or solely on the President's inherent
powers, including those powers derived from his position as Commander-
in-Chief.80 In implementing some international conventions to which the
United Sates is party, Congress has authorized the President to bind the
nation to subsequent amendments to the convention without prior Senate
approval.81 Federal courts also play an important role in applying conven-
tional international law in individual cases. International law is "federal
law," the content and meaning of which is determined by the federal courts.
The courts's determinations are binding on the states. 82
All three branches of the federal government also play important roles in
the development of customary international law.83 The President is bound to
take care that "the Laws" be faithfully executed. 84 Such "laws" include
75 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and Restatement, supra note 19, at § 111 & cmt. j.76 See Restatement, supra note 19, at § 303, and Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President
to Conclude International Agreements, 64 Yale L.J. 345 (1965).
77See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982).
78Restatement, supra note 19, at § 303(4) & cmt. g.79 For example, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1230(b), authorizes and
encourages the President to enter into "executive agreements" with adjacent nations "to establish
comparable vessel standards and vessel traffic services." Similarly, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), provided the legislative complement to the President's
Executive Agreement binding the United States to the Uruguay Round Agreements' establishment of the
World Trade Organization.
8°Restatement, supra note 19, at § I n.2 ("In foreign affairs ... the President is clearly a separate
source of law."). Such agreements are referred to as "sole" executive agreements.
81See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1602(c) & (d) (authorizing the President to implement by proclamation
subsequent amendments to the 1972 Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea, unless Congress earlier expresses its disapproval of the proposed amendments).82See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964). But see infra note 308
(opinion of commentators who argue otherwise),
83Customary international law denotes the body of law which results from a general and consistent
practice of States followed by them from a sense of obligation. Restatement, supra note 19, at § 102(2)
& cmt. b. See also A. Hollick, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea 11-13 (1981) (pointing out
that "the major innovations in the law of the sea-the concepts of the 200 mile zone and the continental
shelf-can both be traced to the U.S.").
84U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
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customary and conventional international law. 85 The President has "plenary
and exclusive power" to act as the "sole organ" of the federal government in
the field of international relations. 86 It is, therefore, the President who most
often asserts or opposes international law claims, and who must answer for
any alleged violation of international law by the United States or its state and
local governments.8 7 Beginning with Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson's
assertion, on behalf of President Washington, of the nation's claim to a three
nautical mile territorial sea in 1793,88 the Executive Branch has taken the
lead in establishing United States foreign policy (and customary interna-
tional law) relating to the law of the sea, including its provisions regarding
shipping and navigation rights. In 1945, President Truman vastly extended
United States claims over resources in the adjacent ocean when he
proclaimed United States jurisdiction over the resources of the continental
shelf.89 In 1983, President Reagan proclaimed a United States Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) extending seaward 200 nautical miles from the
United States coast, while concomitantly reassuring the community of
nations that the United States would continue to respect traditional high seas
navigation rights and grant foreign vessel access to the new EEZ for marine
scientific research. 90 In 1988, President Reagan again shaped United States
85See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdictions, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.").
86See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (dictum), and
Restatement, supra note 19, at § 326.
87 Foreign Affairs, supra note 67, at 233-34. In Edye v. Robertson, the Supreme Court noted that:
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent Nations. It depends for the enforcement of its
provisions on the interest and honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its
infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured
party chooses to seek redress, which in the end may be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that
with all this, the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress. But a treaty may also
contain provisions which confer certain rights on the citizens or subjects of one of the nations
residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partakes of the nature of municipal law, and
which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country.
112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
88Letter from Thomas Jefferson, United States Secretary of State, to George Hammond, British
Minister, Nov. 8, 1793, reprinted in H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 324, 42d Cong., at 553-54 (1872). John
Marshall and Joseph Story both later viewed the territorial sea premised upon this proclamation as part
of the territory of the United States. See Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804) (Marshall,
C.J.); The Ann, I F. Cas. 926, 926-27 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 397) (Story, J.); J. Moore, Digest of
International Law 699-703 (1906).
89 See Presidential Proclamation No. 2667 (1945), 3 C.F.R. pt. 67 (1943-48 Comp.); 13 Dep't State.
Bull. 484-85 (1945); Hollick, supra note 83, at 54 ("The relative absence of direct congressional
participation in the events immediately leading up to the Truman Proclamation is a striking example of
executive domination of foreign policy during wartime.").
90See Presidential Proclamation No. 10605 (1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 5030 (1983), and Statement
Accompanying Proclamation of Exclusive Economic Zone, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 383 (1983),
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 461, 464 (1983).
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ocean policy when he proclaimed a twelve nautical mile territorial sea, while
reaffirming the nation's commitment to preserving the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea and transit passage through international
straits.9 1
Congress too has played an important role in developing customary
international law through its legislation asserting United States claims to
ocean uses. In 1976, Congress enacted the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act,92 establishing a United States Fishery Conservation Zone
extending 200 nautical miles seaward. Congress and federal agencies
consider international law and foreign policy considerations in drafting
statutes and regulations. Moreover, they frequently include provisions in
maritime laws or regulations preserving international law freedoms, express-
ing an intent that the statute is to be construed and applied in a manner
consistent with international law, or extending reciprocity to foreign vessels
which meet international rules and standards.93
Since its earliest days, the United States has shown its resolve to take
diplomatic or military action to preserve its ocean policy objectives. From
President Jefferson's reprisals against the Barbary Pirates in 1801, to the
War of 1812, brought on by British boardings of United States merchant
vessels at sea and impressment of United States merchant seamen, the
United States demonstrated its commitment to the preservation of high seas
freedoms. In response to Cambodia's seizure in 1975 of the United States
merchant vessel Mayaguez while the vessel was in innocent passage seven
miles from the nearest land, President Ford condemned the action as a
violation of international law and ordered United States forces to recapture
the vessel.94 The United States Navy has carried out a "freedom of
navigation" program since 1979,9 5 challenging excessive claims by other
9 tPresidential Proclamation No. 5928 (1988), 54 Fed. Reg. No. 5 (1989).9 2pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976).
93See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1223(d) (exempting vessels in innocent passage or transit passage from certain
requirements under the Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972); 33 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (deepwater port
regulations are "subject to recognized principles of international law"); 33 C.F.R. § 164.02 (exempting
foreign vessels in innocent passage or transit passage from navigation safety regulations); 46 U.S.C. §
3303 (extending reciprocity to foreign vessels other than tankers); 46 U.S.C. § 3702(e) (exempting
foreign tankers in innocent passage from chapter); 46 U.S.C. § 3711 (recognizing foreign tank vessel
compliance certificates); 46 U.S.C. § 5109 (load line reciprocity for foreign vessels); 46 U.S.C. § 9101(a)
(Secretary to determine whether foreign tank vessel's flag state standards for manning, training,
qualification, and watchkeeping are at least equivalent to United States or international standards); 46
U.S.C. § 14306 (tonnage measurement reciprocity for foreign vessels).
94 See [1975] Digest of Practice in International Law 423, and Note, The Mayaguez: The Right of
Innocent Passage and the Legality of Reprisal, 13 San Diego L. Rev. 765 (1976).9 5Gist, U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program (Dec. 1988) (U.S. Dep't of State), reprinted in
Annotated Supplement to the Commanders' Handbook of the Law of Naval Operations, pt. I, at 2-67 to
2-68 (1997).
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nations over ocean waters. President Reagan's 1983 Ocean Policy Statement
reaffirmed that "the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and
overflight rights and freedom on a worldwide basis" in a manner consistent
with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.96 More
recently, Congress has twice condemned Canada's alleged violation of the
right of United States vessels to engage in innocent passage through the
Canadian waters of the Inside Passage, in both cases expressing its apparent
willingness to use force if necessary to preserve those rights.97
B. The State Police Power Authority
State governments possess broad, inherent legislative power.98 Any
governmental powers not prohibited by the United States Constitution99 (or
by the state's constitution) are reserved to the states, or to the people.100 The
powers thus reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment include the
so-called "police power" to prescribe regulations "to promote the health,
peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so
as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its
wealth and prosperity."' 0'1 Not surprisingly, the states' broad reserved
powers often overlap with the federal government's Commerce Clause and
Foreign Relations Clause powers, giving rise to recurring federalism issues.
In some areas of governmental competency the states are said to enjoy a
position of sovereignty.10 2 Commonly cited arguments for the system of
dual-sovereignty inherent in United States federalism include its capacity to
facilitate legislative experimentation among the states, to promote local
autonomy and accountability, and the need for local expertise in certain
legislative areas.' 0 3 In other areas, such as in foreign affairs or foreign
96See supra note 90 (Statement Accompanying Proclamation of Exclusive Economic Zone).97See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
98Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991) (quoting The Federalist No. 45).
99Constitutional limits include, for example, those enumerated in Article I, § 10 of the Constitution
and certain of the amendments forming the Bill of Rights, selectively incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
'°°U.S. Const. amdt. X.
lo'Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
l02See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Statutory Preemption of State
and Local Authority: History, Inventory, and Issues 15-16 (1992) (defining three forms of "dual
sovereignty": (1) state powers not subject to preemption; (2) direct and positive conflict between state
and federal laws; and, (3) administrative or judicial ruling precluding preemption), and R. Berger,
Federalism: The Founders' Design 48-76 (1987) (surveying historical sources relevant to the question
of state sovereignty under the Constitution).
103Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458-59; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); Marcus, Louis D. Brandeis and the Laboratories of Democracy, in Federalism and the
Judicial Mind 75-91 (H. Scheiber ed. 1992). For a contrary view, see Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593 (1980).
Vol. 29, No. 3
Merchant Vessels 351
commerce, state competency is denied or restricted under the Constitu-
tion. 10 4 State authority in the field of maritime affairs is limited by certain
express constitutional prohibitions. For example, the states may not impose
duties on tonnage or on imports or exports.'0 5 Although states are
prohibited from concluding treaties, they may, with the consent of
Congress, enter into compacts or agreements with sister states or foreign
nations. 106 Such regional cooperation in marine pollution prevention and
response through bi-state or multi-state agreements has become common,
particularly in the West, t0 7 where multi-state organizations have been
formed to develop regional approaches to oil spill prevention and
response.10 8
The inherent police power is the most often cited basis for state legislation
affecting maritime matters.'0 9 The police power extends to any matter
affecting the health, peace, education, safety, or morals of those within the
state."t 0 Commentators have observed that the scope of the state police
power is at best poorly defined."' In fact, a persuasive argument can be
made from an examination of the leading cases that the scope of the states'
10 4United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("We repeat that there are limitations on the
sovereignty of States. No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies.
Power over external affairs is not shared with the States; it is vested in the national government
exclusively.").
'
0
°U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cis. 2 & 3. Congress may authorize states to impose such duties, and state
duties on imports and exports are permissible if "absolutely necessary for executing [state] inspection
laws." Id. cl. 2. The "inspection laws" referred to are those concerning inspection of goods, not of vessels.
See infra note 138 and Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261, 263,
1936 AMC 1 (1935) (holding that state may charge reasonable fees for services rendered).
1°tU.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the consent of Congress .... enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.").
'
07 See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 8670.9 (directing state Oil Spill Administrator to "enter into discussion
on behalf of the state with the states of Alaska, Oregon and Washington for the purpose of developing
an interstate compact regarding oil transport by tanker or barge" and to "coordinate the development of
the interstate compact with the Coast Guard, the Province of British Columbia in Canada, and the
Republic of Mexico."); Or. Rev. Stat. § 468B.340(2)(c) (Oregon Legislature declares its intent to promote
a "consistent west coast approach to oil spill prevention and response."); Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 40.301
(authorizing commission to participate in "initiatives to develop multi-state and international stan-
dards.").108One such organization, the States-British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, includes representatives
from California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska and the Province of British Columbia. See further
<www.env.gov.bc.ca/eeb/taskfor/tfbome.htm>.
l°9See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (holding that a state may
require, under authority of its police power, that a vessel's master make certain reports).
t1°Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
"'Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 701 n.51 (1974) ("Though the
Constitution does not use the term, states are often said to have a general 'police power.' The term refers
simply to a general governmental power, and its use means only that nothing in the United States
Constitution requires that state governments possess only 'few and defined powers."').
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police powers is indeterminate.' 1 2 As Professor Ely found in 1974,' 3 the
courts have not articulated a rule or standard for determining the scope of the
states' historic police powers, nor do they appear to question seriously
whether any particular state act under challenge falls within the undefined
power. An approach that casts state police powers as indeterminate is not
helpful, and may in fact skew the court's preemption analysis if a
presumption against preemption is accorded to such legislation without
careful inquiry. That the states' police powers are limited is beyond
reasonable dispute. The states' police powers cannot, for example, be greater
than the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. It follows,
therefore, that they cannot include any powers delegated solely to the federal
government or expressly denied to the states. Nor, it will be seen, can those
powers included subjects which are national in their nature or require
uniform national regulation.
Although there has long been a dispute as to whether the states have the
power to "directly" regulate maritime commerce, it is now beyond dispute
that in the exercise of its police power a state may establish rules applicable
on land and water within its limits, even though those rules "incidentally
affect maritime affairs."' 14 In 1937, in Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss
Co.,115 the Supreme Court upheld a Washington state statute regulating
motor tug boats engaged in interstate and foreign commerce against a
preemption challenge, but only after distinguishing between the nature of the
state's police power and the federal Commerce Clause authority. The Court
observed that when
the state is seeking to prevent the operation of unsafe and unseaworthy vessels
in going to and from its ports, it is exercising a protective power akin to that
which enables the state to exclude diseased persons, animals, and plants. These
are not the proper subjects of commerce, and an unsafe and unseaworthy
vessel is not a proper instrumentality of commerce."16
l' 2See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 542 (1947)
("Other law terms like 'police power' are not symbols at all but labels for the results of the whole
process."). Whether a state law falls within the ambit of its police powers can be crucial in any
preemption analysis. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., a case concerning a preemption challenge to an
Illinois statute purporting to regulate federally licensed grain storage warehouses, Justice Douglas'
majority opinion observed that regulation of grain warehouses was a field which the States have
"traditionally occupied." 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Accordingly, Justice Douglas wrote, "we begin with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Id.
ll3Ely, supra note I11.
""aAskew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 339, 1973 AMC 811 (1973).
"'302 U.S. 1, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937).
"'Id. at 14.
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The Court thus concluded that because unseaworthy tugs are not considered
proper instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce the states were
constitutionally competent to impose certain limited requirements on
them-at least until the federal government enacted legislation establishing
safety standards for those vessels.
In a 1960 decision examining a city ordinance regulating air emissions
from federally licensed and inspected vessels, the Court, in Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,"t7 noted that legislation "designed to free
from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within the
exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously
known as the police power."' 8 In 1978, the Court again invoked the familiar
presumption against preemption of the states' "historic police powers" in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,"19 a case involving a challenge to state
regulation of tank vessel design, equipment, size limits, and operating
requirements. In Ray, the Court did not even question whether the state
tanker regulations fell within the ambit of the states' historic police
powers-the factual predicate for applying the presumption against preemp-
tion-nor did it articulate a test for making such an evaluation.
III
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE REGULATION OF
MERCHANT VESSELS
Notwithstanding the broad reach of the states' police power, state
regulation of merchant vessel safety and pollution prevention is constrained
by three constitutional principles.' 20 First, because merchant vessels are
instrumentalities of commerce, their regulation is governed by the Com-
merce Clause, including the implied "negative" or "dormant" Commerce
Clause doctrine.12' The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine operates to
preclude state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce where the subject
is national or is one which requires a uniform national rule, or where the
state regulation is discriminatory or imposes an undue burden on interstate
or foreign commerce. Second, the field of merchant vessel safety and
pollution prevention is extensively regulated by international and federal
"'362 U.S. 440, 1960 AMC 1549 (1960).
...Id. at 442.
19435 U.S. 151, 157, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
120The limits imposed on state regulatory authority by the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process,
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
contained in Article IV are beyond the scope of this article.
12 1The Supreme Court has alternatively referred to this self-executing aspect of the Commerce Clause
as the "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512
U.S. 298, 310 n.9 (1994).
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laws and regulations. State authority may therefore be preempted and state
laws or regulations may be superseded by those international or federal laws
through operation of the Supremacy Clause. Third, even where state law is
not displaced by operation of the dormant Commerce Clause or preempted
or superseded by operation of the Supremacy Clause, state actions which
interfere with the federal government's exclusive power over the foreign
relations of the United States may be held to be violative of the Constitution.
State regulation of merchant vessels may be conceptually grouped into
one of several categories according to purpose.' 22 A state regulation may be
intended simply to provide a duplicate scheme for enforcing federal
requirements, without creating any new or different state rule or standard.' 2 3
Alternatively, the state regulation may be interstitial; that is, designed to fill
an actual or perceived gap in the federal regulatory scheme by interposing
state standards applicable to a subject for which no federal rules or standards
exist. ' 24 Finally, the state regulation may establish a standard that is different
from the federal standard. The state regulation may differ in that it is either
more or less stringent than the federal standard.' 25 Each of the above
described classes of state regulations may raise distinct questions, such as
whether the state regulation, as applied, regulates the same subject or has the
same purpose as its federal counterpart, 2 6 and whether the state regulation
is consistent with or conflicts with the federal regulation or policy on that
subject.
122Three similar theories are invoked in the context of applying state law in private admiralty cases.
See Burrell, Application of State Law to Maritime Claims: Is There A Better Guide Than Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen?, 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 53, 63 (1996) (state law may be applied to: 1) fill gaps in
maritime law; 2) supplement the maritime law; or, 3) where "local" interests predominate).
123See, e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (examining a state act which made it criminal
under state law to violate certain regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission).
1241n Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 8, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937), for example, the
State of Washington's regulations applied only to motor tugs, which were not subject to inspection by
the federal government. Similarly, in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445,
1960 AMC 1549 (1960), the City of Detroit's regulation applied only to vessel air emissions, a matter
not directly regulated by federal law.
'
25See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978); Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985
AMC 2395 (1985); Note, Oil Tanker Regulation: A State or Federal Area?, 19 Nat. Res. J. 701 (1979).
State acts imposing different or more stringent standards likely reflect a contrary risk evaluation by the
state or a different judgment on the cost-benefit balance to be struck.
126See Huron, 362 U.S. at 445-46 (contrasting the "purpose" of the federal regulations with the
purpose underlying the state smoke emission regulation and finding "no overlap"), and Pacific Gas &
Elect. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (contrasting
federal purpose-to ensure safety of nuclear power facilities-with economic purpose of state act-to
restrict construction of nuclear power facilities until nuclear waste storage and disposal needs could be
addressed).
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A. Commerce Clause Limits on State Authority
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis entails a normative evaluation,
applying judge-made constitutional standards, to determine the appropriate
state role under the constitutional framework in matters affecting commerce.
This section examines the general outline of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine and the extent to which the power to regulate commerce is
exclusively federal. It then provides a particularized analysis of state
regulation of foreign commerce.
1. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is a court-imposed limitation on
state authority which "has long been understood to provide protection from
state legislation inimical to the national commerce even where Congress has
not acted."' 27 Analysis of a state act under the dormant Commerce Clause
asks whether state power to regulate the particular subject matter is
precluded by the constitutional allocation of power over the subject matter
to the federal government. The doctrine comprises three distinct inquiries.
First, whether state competency is denied because the subject to be regulated
is national or requires a uniform national rule. Second, the analysis
determines whether the state act, as implemented, is even-handed. If a state
act discriminates against interstate or foreign commerce it is invalid unless
the state shows that it could not serve the legitimate local purpose by
reasonable, non-discriminatory means. 128 Finally, the inquiry may require a
weighing of the putative state benefits to be obtained from the legislation
against the burden it may impose on interstate or foreign commerce.
Even-handed state laws affecting commerce incidentally may be struck
down if they impose an undue burden on interstate or foreign commerce, 29
or if they purport to control the conduct of non-citizens beyond the state's
borders. 30
Commerce Clause analysis is concerned primarily with the question of
constitutional competency, not construction of federal statutes. If the federal
government has exercised its commerce powers on a subject, by statute or by
127Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 310 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S.
761, 769 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128See Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Dep't of Env. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (holding that
state laws which discriminate against interstate commerce are per se invalid), and New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
129See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988), and United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579-80 (1995) (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
130See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), and Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex
rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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international agreement, the commerce power is no longer "dormant," and
the Court will ordinarily not employ a dormant Commerce Clause analy-
sis. 131 In such cases any constitutional challenge to the state regulations must
be grounded in the Supremacy or Foreign Affairs Clauses. Any examination
of state legislative competency must also consider that Congress may allow
states to legislate on a subject that would, but for the consent of Congress,
be unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.132
Gibbons v. Ogden,133 the Marshall Court's landmark inquiry into feder-
alism in the context of maritime commerce, brought together the advocacy
of Daniel Webster and the constitutional vision of Chief Justice John
Marshall. 34 Webster's arguments to the Court recounted the very kind of
state mischief which the Founders sought to avoid by allocating the power
over commerce to the federal government. 35 Under New York law at the
time, no steam vessel was permitted to navigate on New York waters
without a state license, and such licenses were granted exclusively to two
named individuals. Connecticut banned from its waters any vessel holding a
New York license. New Jersey provided a cause of action with treble
damages recoverable for any citizen of the state who was restrained from
operating vessels in New York. State discrimination threatened to Balkanize
the infant Republic's waterways.
At the outset, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the State of New York's
argument that the Commerce Clause powers of the federal government
should be narrowly construed. 136 On the contrary, the Court held, the federal
Commerce Clause power, like all other powers vested in Congress, "is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than those prescribed in the constitution .... ,,137 The
131See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. I, 12 (1986) ("the dormant
Commerce Clause, in both its interstate and foreign incarnations, only operates where the Federal
Government has not spoken to ensure that the essential attributes of nationhood will not be jeopardized
by States acting as independent economic actors.").
132See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (once Congress acts, courts are not free
to review state regulations under dormant Commerce Clause; when Congress has struck a balance it
deems appropriate, courts are no longer needed to prevent states from burdening commerce), and
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) ("Here
the commerce power of the Congress is not dormant, but has been exercised by that body .... When
Congress so chooses, statutes which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under
the Commerce Clause.") (citations omitted).
'22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
134B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 169-70 (1921) (Chief Justice John Marshall "gave
to the constitution of the United States the impress of his own mind; and the form of our constitutional
law is what it is, because he moulded it while it was still plastic and malleable in the fire of his own
intense convictions.").
'22 U.S. at 4.
'
3 6See id. at 187-88.
13 71d. at 195.
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Court next defined the scope of the federal commerce power as including the
power to regulate the instrumentalities of commerce, including vessels
engaged in interstate commerce. 138 The federal power, the Court explained,
extends to commerce by such vessels even while they are operating within
the limits of the states. 139
Chief Justice Marshall's analysis of the respective arguments by the
advocates in the case marks the seminal occasion on which the Court
identified the close relationship between the federal admiralty jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution (tied as it was to locality on the
navigable waters140) and the federal commerce power over waters used for
interstate or foreign commerce.' 4' Not surprisingly, subsequent cases held
that the power to regulate navigation necessarily carried with it the power to
control the nation's navigable waters. 42 Gibbons and its progeny thus
provided an early constitutional basis for the Congress to enact laws to
promote vessel safety 43 and to protect the navigable waterways of the
nation from obstruction or pollution. 144
Having confirmed the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate
vessels engaged in interstate commerce, even while operating within the
waters of a particular state, the Court turned to the Supremacy Clause
challenge to the New York law which purported to confer an exclusive right
to navigate steamboats in New York waters. Ogden, the holder of the New
York license, sought to enjoin Gibbons from operating his ferryboats
between Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and New York. Gibbons defended,
claiming that his vessels' federal license to engage in the coastwise trade
gave him a right under federal law to navigate between those ports. The
3
'See id. at 190, 197 ("The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary
objects for which the people of American adopted their government."), and id. at 229 ("When speaking
of the power of Congress over navigation, I do not regard it as a power incidental to that of regulating
commerce; I consider it as the thing itself; inseparable from it, as vital motion is from vital existence.")
(Johnson, J., concurring). Although the Court distinguished state "inspection laws," "the purpose of
which was to enhance safety and not to restrict competition," it is clear from the context of the opinion
and the arguments of counsel that the Court was referring to inspection of "goods" being imported or
exported, not of the instrumentalities of commerce. Id. at 118 -23, 203.
1391d. at 107. See also Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 414, 415, 462 (1849).
14°See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).14 1See id. at 21-22 ("It is not unreasonable, to say, that what are called the waters of New York, are,
for purposes for navigation and commercial regulation, the waters of the United States ... their use, for
those purposes, seems to be intrusted to the exclusive power of congress."). See also id. at 92-96
(contrary arguments by respondents).
142See, e.g., Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866).
143See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871) (upholding the application of federal steamboat
inspection laws to vessels plying the navigable waters of the United States within the boundaries of a
single state).
144See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-406; Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791a-828c; Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, tit. I, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236.
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Court held that the New York law was preempted to the extent that it
precluded a licensee from engaging in a trade to which he was entitled under
the federal law.
Beyond its preemption holding, the Court's decision in Gibbons is an
important datum point in the development of federalism jurisprudence
owing to Chief Justice Marshall's intimation that the decision could have
been grounded instead on Daniel Webster's argument that the federal
Commerce Clause power was exclusive. 145 At the time, three theories of
Commerce Clause authority competed for acceptance: (1) the theory that the
power was exclusively federal; (2) the concurrent power theory, which
posited that the state governments enjoyed concurrent power over com-
merce, just as they do in most taxation matters; and, (3) the compromise
theory, eventually adopted by the Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
which recognized state concurrent power over local commerce matters, but
entrusted those commerce matters which are national or which require a
uniform national rule solely to the federal government. 146
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that there "is great force to
[Webster's] argument, and the court is not satisfied that it has been
refuted."'147 Declining, however, to reach the constitutional question when
the case could be decided on statutory preemption grounds, the Court
deferred the Commerce Clause inquiry for another day.' 48 That Gibbons left
unresolved the respective limits of state and federal power over commerce
is demonstrated by the fact that the Court heard more than 100 cases
involving construction of the Commerce Clause in the next sixty years. 149
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Court first answered the question
whether the federal Commerce Clause power is exclusive or concurrent. The
case concerned a constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania statute requiring
14122 U.S. at 13, 209, 221. In summarizing Webster's arguments, the Court pointed out, "He did not
mean to say, that all regulations which might, in their operation, affect commerce, were exclusively in
the power of congress; but that such power as had been exercised in this case, did not remain with the
states." Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). Compare the arguments of Oakley for the Respondent, id. at 63
(the commerce power is concurrent).
146See J. Kallenbach, Federal Cooperation with the States Under the Commerce Clause 24-45
(1968).
14'22 U.S. at 209.
148 1d. at 210 (should the New York law "come into collision with an act of congress ... it will be
immaterial, whether those laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power to regulate commerce")
(internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Story, relying on Gibbons and Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat) 419, 445, 446 (1827), later concluded that the federal commerce power was exclusive. Story,
supra note 48, at §§ 1063 & 1067. He also reported in his dissenting opinion in Mayor of New York v.
Miln, 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) 102 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting), that while on the Court, Chief Justice Marshall
was prepared to declare the federal commerce power exclusive.
149B. Gavit, The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution app. A (1932) (summarizing
cases).
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vessels engaged in foreign or interstate commerce to engage a local
navigation pilot to guide the vessel into and out of the state's ports. 150 The
majority found no conflict with any federal statute, obviating the Supremacy
Clause analysis employed in Gibbons. The majority's analysis then turned to
the question whether state authority to regulate vessels engaged in interstate
or foreign commerce was displaced by the Commerce Clause. 15' If the
federal Commerce Clause power was exclusive, the states were without
power to legislate on matters touching upon commerce even in the absence
of federal legislation. If, on the other hand, the commerce power was, like
the taxation power, concurrent then state laws were valid unless preempted
by federal legislation.' 52
Justice Curtis, writing for the six member majority, 153 adopted what has
become known as the "selectively exclusive" approach to federal Commerce
Clause analysis. He first framed the analysis as turning on the question
whether the subject matter regulated by the state legislation was "in [its]
nature national, or admit(s) of only one uniform system or plan of
regulation."'' 54 If the subject was national or admits of only one uniform
system or plan of regulation, the subject is one for "exclusive legislation by
Congress."' 55 Applying the rule to the Pennsylvania pilotage statute, the
majority determined that the subject was essentially local, and therefore
appropriate for state legislation. 56 The Court's decision was apparently
influenced in large part by the fact that the first Congress had, in 1789,
enacted legislation which "manifests the understanding of Congress, at the
outset of the government, that the nature of this subject is not such as to
require its exclusive [federal] legislation."'' 57 At the same time, however, the
Court recognized that the state statute might later be preempted by federal
150The Act applied to vessels arriving from, or bound to, foreign ports or places, and to vessels of 75
or more tons sailing from or to ports outside the Delaware River. 53 U.S. at 311. Vessels covered by the
Act were required either to take a pilot or pay one-half of the pilotage fee to a fund for the relief of
disabled pilots or their widows and children.
'
5 11d. at 318 ("we are brought directly and unavoidably to the consideration of the question, whether
the grant of commercial power to Congress, did per se deprive the states of all power to regulate pilots.").
152Id. at 318-19.
'
53justice Daniel, best known for his dissents from earlier cases which expanded the federal admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, concurred in the judgment but not in the majority's reasoning. Justice Daniel
opined that Congress' commerce powers did not extend to pilotage regulations. Id. at 326. Justices
McClean and Wayne dissented, reasoning that the Court's prior decisions provided no authority for the
states to legislate on matters of interstate or foreign commerce. Id. at 322-23.1541d. at 319.
1551d. See also California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949) ("the familiar test is that of uniformity
versus locality. If a case falls within an area in commerce thought to demand a uniform national rule, state
action is struck down. If the activity is one of predominately local interest, state action is sustained.").
156Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319.
1571d. at 320 (quoting Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 54) ("How then can we say, that by the mere grant
of power to regulate commerce, the states are deprived of all the power to legislate on this subject,
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legislation if Congress chose to enact federal pilotage statutes applicable to
the same vessels. Thus, although Congress could constitutionally supersede
such local regulations through the exercise of its Commerce Clause (or
Admiralty Clause158) powers, and such federal laws would then displace any
conflicting state law by operation of the Supremacy Clause, 159 until
Congress acts such "maritime but local" regulations are within the power of
the state legislatures. 160 By contrast, if the subject had been deemed national
or to admit of only one uniform system or plan of regulation, the state law
would be displaced, and (under Cooley) even Congress could not empower
the states to regulate the subject. 16'
Thus, Congress has the express power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce and may if it chooses completely preempt the states from any
subject falling within that power. Even in the absence of preemptive federal
legislation the states may not constitutionally legislate on subjects where the
subject is national or admits of only one uniform system or plan of
regulation."62 By contrast, states may legislate on peculiarly local subjects,
unless superseded by federal law. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in
Cooley provided no test for determining whether a subject matter is
because from the nature of the power the legislation of Congress must be exclusive?"). The saving clause
for state pilotage regulation is presently codified at 46 U.S.C. § 8501(a).
158The Supreme Court has applied a similar "maritime and local" standard in private litigation arising
under the Admiralty Clause, to permit application of state remedies law in situations where, because of
the "local" nature of the claim, application of state law would not disrupt the harmony and uniformity
of the general maritime law. See, e.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921). In his
concurring opinion in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 321-24, 1955 AMC
467 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), Justice Frankfurter relied on a comparable "maritime but local"
standard.
159State regulation of pilotage for coastwise vessels (vessels transiting between two United States
ports) was, in fact, later superseded. See 46 U.S.C. § 8502 and Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 159-60, 1978 AMC 527 (1978) (citing Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 (1912)).
16The Court's allegiance to the Cooley test was reaffirmed in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 625 (1973). See also Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d
1409, 1991 AMC 2797 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 979 (1992) (applying the Jensen
"uniformity" test to a case involving a challenge to a state regulation of crew wages). For a criticism of
the result reached in Aubry, see Scowcroft, Note, 23 J. Mar. L. & Com. 635 (1992).
6 1Cooley, 53 U.S. at 317 ("If the states were divested of the power to legislate on this subject by the
grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this [federal pilotage] act could not confer upon
them the power thus to legislate."). This rule barring even Congress from empowering states to legislate
on matters which are in their nature national or require a uniform national rule is virtually identical to the
rule for private admiralty law established in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). See
Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1, 19
(1997).
162The Cooley Commerce Clause test is quite similar to the Jensen test formulated to address similar
state law displacement question arising under the substantive admiralty law. See generally M. Ball, Law
of the Sea: Federal-State Relations 61 & n.257 (1978) (concluding that the "uniformity/diversity measure
may be said to serve as a standard common to analysis" under the admiralty, commerce, and supremacy
clauses).
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essentially national or admits of only one uniform system of regulation, or
is maritime but local, and therefore amenable to state regulation. Later cases
have upheld state regulation of vessels under the maritime but local
exception when the state sought to establish regulations for anchoring or
mooring vessels, 163 or to designate wharves or piers which may be used to
receive or load cargo or passengers. 164 A second weakness in the Cooley
maritime but local formulation is its failure to provide a clear subject focus
for the inquiry. The opinion adverts to the legislative "subject," but never
identifies what the exact subject of its inquiry was, or how broadly or
narrowly the subject is to be defined. 165 Later courts were therefore left to
determine whether the Cooley maritime but local inquiry turns on the nature
of the activity regulated (commercial vessel pilotage in coastal waters) or on
the consequences which the state regulation seeks to avoid (safety of life and
property on state waterways). The distinction is an important one 166 and, as
will be seen, one for which the answer has not been consistent.
Three later cases by the Supreme Court examining direct state regulation
of commercial vessel safety and vessel-source pollution provide guidance in
this maritime federalism inquiry. In Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., a
1937 challenge to a Washington state motor tug safety and inspection statute
by a company whose tugs were engaged in interstate and foreign commerce,
the Washington Supreme Court had earlier invalidated the statute after
concluding that the federal government had occupied the field of safety and
inspection of vessels on navigable waters of the United States. 67 The state
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Chief Justice Hughes began
his analysis for the unanimous Court by acknowledging the federal govern-
ment's authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the tugs covered by
the Washington statute. 168 The Court found, however, that the federal
163See Norfolk S, Corp. v. Oberly, 594 F. Supp. 514 (D. Del. 1984) & 632 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Del.
1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 388, 1987 AMC 2896 (3d Cir. 1987) (upholding local restrictions on anchoring
in Delaware Bay).
164See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261, 1936 AMC I
(1935), and Workman v. City of New York, 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
1651n its approach to constitutional jurisdiction under the Admiralty Clause, the Court has generally
favored a very broad subject matter inquiry. See Sisson v. Ruby, in which the Court held that the subject
matter inquiry for admiralty tort jurisdiction requires an assessment of the "general features of the type
of incident involved." 497 U.S. 358, 363, 1990 AMC 1801 (1990) (emphasis added).
166For example, the "subject" of vessel "standards as to structure, design, equipment, and operation"
requires a uniform national rule. Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 15, 1937 AMC 1490
(1937). However, state regulation of vessel-source pollution does not. See Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 1960 AMC 1549 (1960).
167State ex rel. Foss Co. v. Kelly, 59 P.2d 373, 376 (Wash. 1936), rev'd, 302 U.S. 1, 1937 AMC 1490
(1937).
168302 U.S. at 4 (holding that "[i]t cannot be doubted that the power of Congress over interstate and
foreign commerce embraces the authority to make regulations for" safety and inspection of tugs.).
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government had so far exercised its authority only with respect to limited
classes of towing vessels (those propelled by steam or those carrying
passengers or cargo), while leaving motor tugs unregulated.1 69 When the
Court turned to the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, it first restated the
rule established in Cooley, noting that the question whether the federal
government had occupied the field was "unnecessary and inapposite if the
subject is one demanding uniformity of regulation so that state action is
altogether inadmissible in the absence of federal action."' 170 "In that class of
cases," the Court held, "the Constitution itself occupies the field even if
there is no federal legislation."' 171 The Court expressed its concern over the
potential problems which might arise if states were permitted to regulate
vessel design, equipment, and operation, 72 but nevertheless concluded that
there was a limited field within which states were constitutionally competent
to act. "If, however, the state goes further and attempts to impose particular
standards as to structure, design, equipment and operation ... which pass
beyond what is plainly essential to safety and seaworthiness, the state will
encounter the principle that such requirements, if imposed at all, must be
through the action of Congress which can establish a uniform rule."' 173 The
Court declined to provide any guidance on how it would determine whether
a state law was "essential" to safety or seaworthiness. It is clear from the
Court's discussion in Kelly, however, that its decision was heavily influ-
enced by the fact that the only vessels that would be subject to the
Washington statutes fell outside of the federal regulatory scheme in place at
that time. ' 74
In 1960, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority of the Court in Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,175 examined the constitutionality of
Detroit's enforcement of a smoke abatement ordinance on merchant vessels
engaged in interstate commerce on the Great Lakes. The Court's precedents
6 91d. at 8.
1701d. at 9.
17 11d.
1721d. at 15 (emphasis added). The Court also warned that, if permitted, the "state of Washington
might prescribe standards, designs, equipment, and rules of one sort, Oregon another, California another,
and so on." Id.
1731d.
'
74The same concerns were expressed by the Court in The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 1996
AMC 2372 (1875), in which it upheld a state maritime lien law. The Court first observed that "[lI]t would
undoubtedly be far more satisfactory to have a uniform maritime law regulating ... liens," but because
Congress had so far failed to enact such a system, the states were free to do so "until Congress interposes,
and thereby excludes further State legislation." Id. at 581. Congress later enacted a "Commercial
Instruments and Maritime Liens" chapter, which expressly supersedes most state law maritime liens. See
46 U.S.C. § 31307.
17'362 U.S. 440, 1960 AMC 1549 (1960). See generally Note, State Environmental Protection and the
Commerce Clause, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1762, 1769-72 (1974).
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established a two-part test for the validity of local laws designed to
evenhandedly promote the health and welfare of local inhabitants. Such
laws, Justice Stewart explained, will be upheld unless preempted by federal
law or unduly burdensome on maritime activities or interstate commerce. 176
The majority dismissed the Commerce Clause challenge in two paragraphs
which focused on whether the Detroit ordinance was discriminatory. 77
Interestingly, even though the subject regulated in both Kelly and Huron-
commercial vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce-was the
same, in Huron the Court focused on the purpose of the respective federal
and state regulations rather than on their subject.178 The Court's opinion
provides no insight into how it determined whether the subject involved was
one which was in its nature national or which required a uniform rule.
Justices Douglas and Frankfurter dissented on preemption grounds after
distinguishing the Detroit ordinance from the Washington statute at issue in
Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co. Kelly, Justice Douglas explained,
involved a state law affecting a matter "which the federal laws and
regulations left untouched" (the subject test followed by the Court in
Kelly). 179 By contrast, the federal law at issue in Huron provided a
comprehensive regulatory scheme for vessel boilers and their fuels. 80 The
Detroit ordinance in effect denied the challengers the opportunity to operate
their vessels in Detroit notwithstanding their compliance with federal law. ' 8'
The dissenters criticized the majority's decision as inviting a "variety of
requirements for equipment" which the states would now be permitted to
force on vessel owners in order to meet state and local air pollution control
measures. 
82
The third of the vessel safety and pollution prevention cases is the Court's
1978 decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 183 Ray involved a challenge
176Huron, 362 U.S. at 443.
1771d. at 448.
1781d. at 445.
1791d. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Douglas & Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting).
18Id. Justice Douglas apparently found a similar distinction between the federal Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970 and the Florida statute at issue in Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973). The WQIA was restricted to a spiller's liability to the federal
government for removal costs. The Florida law was addressed to liability for state government removal
costs and damage to public and private property in the state. Because the acts were addressed to different
subjects, the Court concluded, there was no possibility of conflict. Cf. id. at 341-44. The three judge
panel which heard the original challenge found that a conflict was "inevitable" between the Florida
requirement for vessels to carry containment equipment and federal law, as established by the federal
Steamboat Inspection Act and the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea. See American
Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1246, 1972 AMC 91 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd,
411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973).
"'tHuron, 362 U.S. at 451-52 (Douglas & Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting).
1821d. at 455.
1834 3 5 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
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by two oil transport companies, joined by the United States as amicus curiae,
to the Washington State Tanker Law. The Tanker Law imposed pilotage
requirements, vessel size limits, and equipment and operating requirements
on tankers navigating in Washington waters. Five years earlier, in Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., '184 the Court had briefly examined the
question regarding displacement of state law in the area of remedies for
vessel-source pollution under private law. Ray presented the distinct but
related question regarding possible displacement of state safety laws
directed at tankers operating in state waters. Having invalidated in earlier
sections of the decision the state's construction, design, and equipment
requirements on preemption grounds, Justice White's opinion for the
Court 185 turned to the question whether the state's escort tug requirement,
though not preempted, might nevertheless be an invalid encroachment upon
the federal commerce power. Justice White likened the Washington escort
tug requirement to the local pilotage requirement at issue in Cooley; an
operating rule "arising from the peculiarities of local waters that call for
special precautionary measures."' 86 Finding that a requirement that a vessel
take on a tug escort when entering a particular body of water is not the type
of regulation that demands a uniform national rule, Justice White concluded
that the Washington requirement did not violate the Commerce Clause. 187
2. State Authority in Matters Affecting Foreign Commerce
Foreign commerce and the instrumentalities used to facilitate that com-
merce are a matter of heightened national concern. In this "unique" context,
the Supreme Court has ruled, the states' power is constrained by a "special
need for federal uniformity."'' 88 State regulation of foreign commerce raises
14411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973). Askew addressed the narrow remedial law question of
whether a state law providing for recovery of marine pollution removal costs and damages, thereby
"overlapping" with the maritime law, was displaced by Jensen and Knickerbocker or by the federal Water
Quality Improvement Act.
185Six justices (Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan, and Rehnquist) joined Justice White
in Part VII of the decision, which addressed the escort tug requirement. See 435 U.S. at 181. Justices
Stevens and Powell dissented from Part VII. See id. at 190. The voting pattern in the case is analyzed
in H. Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court § 27-4, at 708-23 (3d ed. 1979).
186435 U.S. at 171.
t871d. at 171-72 & 179. Earlier in the opinion the Court addressed the circumstances in which the
Washington escort tug requirement might be preempted. Id. at 171-72 ("It may be that rules will be
forthcoming that will pre-empt the State's present tug-escort rule, but until that occurs, the State's
requirement need not give way under the Supremacy Clause.") (dictum). Readers familiar with the
legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 will recognize the importance of the Court's decision
in Ray, the one case Congress singled out to expressly preserve against legislative overruling. See H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 122 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 800. The effect of OPA 90 on
maritime preemption will be analyzed in Part II of this article.
188Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
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the additional concern that the nation must "speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relationships with foreign governments."' 89 The
Court has acknowledged that foreign policy is "much more the province of
the Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court."' 90 Accordingly, the
opinion of the Executive Branch regarding the potential impact of state
action on the nation's foreign affairs or commerce is crucial,' 9' but not
dispositive, 92 in the Court's assessment of state laws which implicate the
Foreign Commerce Clause. 193
In reviewing the constitutionality of state regulations the Supreme Court's
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis often closely resembles the Supremacy
Clause analysis (discussed below). 194 State legislation which affects foreign
commerce and foreign relations is subject to stricter scrutiny than are state
laws affecting only interstate commerce. 95 The Court's solicitude for
foreign commerce is grounded in part on the policy of uniformity embodied
in the Commerce Clause. 196 The Court has also recognized that "in
international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the
people of the United States act through a single government with unified and
adequate national power."'' 97 The Supreme Court sounded this theme in Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., when it highlighted the need for the nation to speak
with one voice in matters of vessel design and construction. 198
189iapan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449, 1979 AMC 881 (1979) (quoting
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
19°Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983).
191See Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 73, 1993 AMC 2318 (1993)
(distinguishing the Court's decision in Japan Line with that in Container Corp. in part on the basis of
the fact that the Executive Branch had decided not to file an amicus curiae brief in Container Corp.).
1921d. at 75 (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 195-96). Justice Scalia rejects the principle, to the
extent that it accredits the Executive's opinion, on the ground that the decision on "which state regulatory
interests should currently be subordinated to our national interest in foreign commerce" is solely one for
the Congress. Id. at 81 (Scalia, J., concurring). On this point, Justice Blackmun agreed. Id. at 85
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("it is well established that Congress may authorize state regulation of foreign
commerce which would otherwise be impermissible, but the President may not authorize such regulation
by filing an amicus curiae brief.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
'
93See Wardair, 477 U.S. at 12 ("It would turn dormant Commerce Clause analysis entirely upside
down to apply it where the Federal Government has acted, and to apply it in such a way as to reverse
the policy that the Federal Government has elected to follow.").
194 See Schmahmann & Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United
States Restricting Business Ties With Burma (Myanmar), 30 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 175, 183 n.28, 199
(1997) (citing the Court's "one national voice" analysis in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 1979 AMC 881 (1979)). See also Schmahmann et al., Off the Precipice: Massachusetts
Expands Its Foreign Policy Expedition from Burma to Indonesia, 30 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1021 (1997).
195 See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 n.7 (1984); Wardair, 477 U.S.
at 7-8; Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194 (distinguishing between the "one voice" constraint imposed by
the Foreign Affairs Clause and Article VI preemption analysis).
196 Wardair, 477 U.S. at 8.
197 Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (quoted in Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448).
'9'435 U.S. 151, 168, 1978 AMC 527 (1978). The Court held that it is not within the power of a state
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B. Supremacy Clause Limits on State Authority
Commerce Clause analysis of state laws regulating merchant vessel safety
begins with the recognition that the power to regulate some aspects of
commerce is shared between federal and state governments.' 99 Where,
however, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine applies it operates to oust
the states of legislative competence, without regard to whether Congress has
enacted federal legislation on the same subject. Even where the state law
does not run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause, state authority may
nevertheless be preempted and state laws may be superseded by operation of
the Supremacy Clause. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine may thus be
viewed as a rule of constitutional preemption, while the Supremacy Clause
is seen as a rule of preemption by other federal law sources.
1. Effect of Preemption and Supersession Doctrines
Article VI of the Constitution provides the textual basis for the modem
federal preemption doctrine.200 Briefly stated, the doctrine provides that so
long as the federal government acts within a subject area delegated to it by
the Constitution, any state or local government law that conflicts with the
"law of the land" so created is preempted by operation of the Supremacy
Clause. Equally important to its role in establishing the supremacy of federal
law is the power of judicial review Article VI implicitly confers upon the
federal courts.201 The Supremacy Clause acts not only to supersede state
to impose different or stricter standards than Congress has enacted with the hope of having them
internationally adopted or accepted as a result of the international accord. Id.
199Analogously, in the private maritime law area, the Court's analysis in Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 1978 AMC 811 (1973), identifies the three inquiries which are
relevant in evaluating state regulations affecting maritime commerce: (1) whether the state law conflicts
with federal law; (2) whether the state law is preempted by federal law; and, (3) "whether a State
constitutionally may exercise its police power respecting maritime activities concurrently with the
Federal Government."
2
°°Article VI provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.... Members of the several State
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
20 1See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (affirming the Court's power of judicial
review of federal legislation); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (exercising judicial review
of a state statute); The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison) ("in controversies relating to the boundary
between the two jurisdictions" of national and state governments, "the tribunal which is ultimately to
decide, is to be established under the general government."); The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton).
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laws which conflict with federal law, it also acts to preempt or preclude state
authority to enact laws or regulations that, while not inconsistent with
federal law, purport to regulate a subject which the federal government has
intended to entrust solely to federal control. The law of the land which is
"supreme" under Article VI includes not only the statutes enacted by
Congress, but also proclamations by the President,202 regulations promul-
gated by federal administrative agencies under authority of federal law, 20 3
and international law, including both its customary and conventional
components.
2. Traditional Preemption Analysis
In its approach to federal preemption questions the Supreme Court has
fashioned a two-tier analysis. First, if Congress (or another source of federal
law) has either explicitly or implicitly evidenced an intent to exclusively
occupy a given field, state authority to regulate that same field is preempt-
ed.2°4 Second, even when Congress has not entirely displaced state regula-
tion over the subject matter, state law is superseded if it conflicts with
federal law. A conflict will be found if the court determines that it is
impossible to comply with both the federal law and its state counterpart, 20 5
or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. 20 6
In conducting preemption analyses the courts have recognized that the
particular subject matter being regulated is a critical factor in the court's
analysis. 20 7 As discussed earlier, if the subject matter is in its nature national
or one which requires a uniform rule, state authority will be displaced by the
202See Neighbors, Presidential Legislation By Executive Orders, 37 U. Colo. L. Rev. 105 (1964).203See Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(citations omitted), and Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1979). The regulations must be
based on a valid delegation of authority. See City of New York v. F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988).2
°4See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), and Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978). Professor Tribe refers to federal occupation of a field as a
"jurisdictional veto" of state authority. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-27, at 497 (2d ed.
1988).205See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). It is doubtful whether
the particular application of the preemption test to the facts in Florida Lime would command the
allegiance of the modem Court. See Ray, 435 U.S. at 168 n.19 (distinguishing Florida Lime in part
because the "federal regulations claimed to pre-empt state law [in that case] were drafted and
administered by local organizations.").206See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190 (1983), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (holding that the federal Alien Registration Act
preempts state regulation of aliens). The test is sometimes alternatively posed as whether there is an
"irreconcilable conflict between the Federal and State rules and standards." Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256.207See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985).
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dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The Court has also recognized that a
few areas involving "uniquely federal interests" are so committed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is
preempted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law.20 8 Federal court
decisions demonstrate a tendency to more readily displace state law in cases
involving commercial merchant shipping-particularly international ship-
ping-than in more localized maritime matters.2 09 And states may be
preempted from prescribing regulations governing the safety aspects of an
industry even though they are free to impose civil liability for conduct which
complies with the preemptive federal safety standards. 2 0 Finally, when
Congress has created a federal agency to regulate a particular subject matter
or industry, the Court is more likely to find state authority displaced.
a. Express Preemption
Analysis of the states' role in regulating the safety of vessels plying the
high seas or navigable waters begins with the recognition that Congress may
constitutionally preempt the states from all regulation of commerce, includ-
ing shipping. 21t An intent to preempt may be made expressly or by
implication. 212 Government statutes or regulations may expressly preempt
state authority over a given subject area by including a plain statement that
the federal act is intended to occupy the field. 213 In such cases, the states are
20 8See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
2
°9Cf. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202, 1996 AMC 305 (1996) (limiting
the Court's holding on the availability of state law remedies to "non-seafarers"); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S.
358, 367, 1990 AMC 1801 (1990) (the fundamental interest giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is "the
protection of maritime commerce") (citations omitted); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
348 U.S. 310, 321-24, 1955 AMC 467 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (questioning whether the
majority's choice of law rule for marine insurance would apply to oceangoing vessels engaged in
international trade); Jones v. Sea Tow Servs. Freeport NY Inc., 30 F.3d 360, 1994 AMC 2661 (2d Cir.
1994) (refusing to enforce a Lloyd's Open Form salvage contract against the owner of a pleasure yacht);
Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1416, 1991 AMC 2797 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 979 (1992) (distinguishing in its preemption analysis between vessels which depart from
and return to the same state and those engaged in foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise trade).2 10 For example, in Pacific Gas & Electric the Court held that federal law occupied the field of nuclear
power plant safety, yet in Silkwood a narrowly divided Court upheld an award of punitive damages under
state law for damages resulting from the escape of nuclear material from a federally licensed facility.
21'See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947). In Gibbons, the Supreme Court
affirmed the preemptive effect of federal legislation under Article VI. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall explained that by operation of the Supremacy Clause, acts of the state legislatures must yield
if they "interfere with, or are contrary to the law of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution." 22
U.S. at 209.212 See The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 198 (1903).213 See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (providing that, unless permitted by the Secretary, states "may not
establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated
equipment performance or other safety standard, or imposing a requirement for associated equipment.").
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precluded from legislating on the subject without regard to whether the state
legislation is consistent with the federal act.21 4 Although preemption
statements are not infrequently included in federal legislation, they are
seldom unambiguous in their scope. 21 5 In areas traditionally regulated by the
states through the exercise of their police powers, the courts apply a
presumption in favor of a narrow interpretation of express preemption
clauses.21 6 The Supreme Court at one time suggested that when Congress
includes a preemption provision in a statute matters beyond the reach of that
provision are, by implication, not preempted. 21 7 Later, however, the Court
left open the possibility that implied preemption might be found notwith-
standing the fact that the subject the state seeks to regulate falls outside of an
express preemption clause z.2 8 Lower courts have concluded that an express
preemption clause does not preclude a finding of implied preemption. 219
It could reasonably be concluded that all international agreements to
which the United States is party preempt state authority on the same subject
as a matter of law.2 20 Treaties and other international agreements must bind
the entire nation or they are not binding at all. Unless a different intention
appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon
each party throughout its territory. 221 A party may not excuse a violation of
its treaty obligation by asserting a provision of its internal laws. 222 It may
2 14See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977), and Rice, 331 U.S. at 236.2 15See Tribe, supra note 204, § 6-27, at 500-01.2 16See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230), and
Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1997 AMC 1921 (1 1th Cir.) (applying the canon of
construction in a preemption challenge relating to motorboat propeller guards), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct.
439 (1997). On the importance of such a canon of construction, see 2B N. Singer, Sutherland's Statutes
and Statutory Construction § 58.02 (5th ed. 1992).2 17See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (Congress's enactment of a
provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
preempted). But see Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 337, 347-49 (D.V.I. 1997)
(disputing the legitimacy of applying the statutory construction maxim of "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius" in such cases), and 2A Singer, supra note 216, at § 47.25 ("It must be remembered that in the
usual circumstances the application of the maxim is subordinated to the basic rule of statutory
construction that the intent of the statute prevails.").2 18See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-89 (1995) (the existence of an express
preemption clause "does not ... entirely foreclose[ ] any possibility of implied preemption").2 19See Toy Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615, 623 (2d Cir. 1992), and American Auto.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 973 F. Supp. 288, 309 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).220See generally Restatement, supra note 19, at § 115 cmt. e (observing that the matter has not been
adjudicated).22 1See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force 1980, art. 29, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 890 (1969) & 6F Benedict on
Admiralty, Doc. No. 21-1 (7th rev. ed. 1997). Although the United States is not a party to the convention,
the Supreme Court has relied upon it in construing the meaning of treaties. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi,
456 U.S. 25, 29 n.5 (1982). This is consistent with the treatment accorded to the convention by the
Restatement. See Restatement, supra note 19, at § 102(3) cmt. f & introductory note to pt. 11.222Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 221, at art. 27.
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therefore be concluded that state legislation bearing on the same subject as
an international agreement to which the United States is party should be
presumed to be preempted unless the President has entered appropriate
exceptions or reservations to the treaty or the implementing United States
law includes a provision affirmatively saving state legislative competency
on that subject.
b. Implied Preemption
Until 1949, there was respectable authority for the proposition that
whenever the federal government regulated a particular subject any state law
regulating that same subject was invalid.2 23 Federal legislation on a subject
was presumed to occupy the field whether Congress had manifested its
intent to do so or not. In that circumstance any state laws establishing
requirements consistent with or more stringent than federal standards were
invalid. The argument for automatic displacement of state law was laid to
rest in 1949, however, by a narrowly divided Court in California v. Zook.224
Thereafter, challenges to state regulations on the basis of implied preemp-
tion required a showing that Congress intended to preempt state laws. 22 5
Implied preemption analysis may involve one or more canons of con-
struction or presumptions. 226 For example, the Court has expressed a
reluctance to find preemption in areas traditionally occupied by the states.2 27
As a result, when a state's exercise of its police powers in a field in which
the states have traditionally occupied 228 is challenged under the Supremacy
Clause, the Court has adopted an "assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
223See, e.g., Charleston & W. Cent. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915), and
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 345 (1927). The Supreme Court left the question open in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320 (1852) (declining to decide the "general
question how far any regulation of a subject by Congress, may be deemed to operate as an exclusion of
all legislation by the states, upon the same subject.").
224336 U.S. 725, 729-31 (1949). Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton dissented at
length.
225See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983).2 26The Court has characterized the presumption as being "grounded in experience . Zook, 336
U.S. at 728-29. See also Frankfurter, supra note 112, at 569 (canons of construction "give an air of
abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in fact a delicate judgment, concluding a complicated process
of balancing subtle and elusive elements."). Justice Scalia has criticized presumptions as canons of
construction because they are artificial and likely to increase the unpredictability and occasional
arbitrariness of judicial decisions. A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 28 (1997).
227See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996) (quoting Rice).
228See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted). See also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), and Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250 (citations omitted).
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the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 229 The presumption "provides
assurance that the federal-state balance will not be disturbed unintentionally
by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts."230 The presumption favors state
legislation "in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of
the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the
Congress has unmistakably so ordained."23' Mere silence by Congress
cannot suffice to establish a clear and manifest purpose to preempt state
authority. 232 However, Congressional intent may be inferred from the
structure and purpose of the federal law. 233
In determining whether Congress intended to occupy fully a particular
field the fact that Congress gave an administrative agency discretion to
regulate the activity is important.234 Agency statements on the question of
implicit intent to preempt state regulation are dispositive unless either the
agency's position is inconsistent with clearly expressed congressional intent
or subsequent developments reveal a change in that position.2 35 Similarly,
the Court has recognized that the regulating agency may be "uniquely
qualified" to determine whether the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. 236 The agency's regulations should prevail in such circumstances
unless it is clear that Congress would not have sanctioned preemption of the
state laws.2 37 An intent to preempt state authority has been inferred where
federal law provided that the activity which is the subject of the state law can
occur "only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands
of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal
229Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citations omitted). See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
Chief Justice Stone appears to have been the first member of the Court to argue in favor of such a
presumption. See Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 177 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
But cf. H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939) (holding that congressional intent to
supersede a state safety statute must be clearly manifested). The presumption has been applied in both
express and implied preemption analyses. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.
1997).23 0Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 525 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).23 1Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
232See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607 (1991) (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
233See Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 525 (citing City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S.
624, 633 (1973), and Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).234See Tribe, supra note 204, § 6-28, at 503 (the very existence of a specialized federal regulatory
agency may signify a congressional determination that some jurisdictionally-definable aspect of the
regulated subject matter demands uniform national supervision). See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 177, 1978 AMC 527 (1978) (concluding that Congress intended that judgments regarding
tanker safety would be made by a single national decision-maker).235See Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 (1985) (citing
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).236Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2255 (1996).237 5ee Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
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commands. '2 38 Even if an agency has comprehensively dealt with a problem
the court will not readily infer federal occupation of the field unless the
agency makes clear its intent that the regulations are to be exclusive. 239 If the
agency does not speak to the question of preemption the court will "pause
before saying that the mere volume and complexity of its regulations
indicates that the agency did in fact intend to preempt." 240
In its recent preemption cases the Court generally begins by examining
both the text of the federal law and any relevant legislative history (or, it
would follow, executive intent in the case of international agreements), to
determine whether the federal government implicitly intended to exclusively
occupy the field.24I The entire scheme of the relevant federal law must be
considered, and that which must be implied is of no less force than that
which was expressed.2 42 Implicit intent may be evidenced by a pervasive
scheme of federal regulation that leaves no room for state and local
supplementation. 243 Intent to displace state law may also be inferred if the
state law touches a field (e.g., foreign affairs) in which "the federal interest
is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject."'244 Finally, an intent to
assign the subject exclusively to the federal government may be inferred
when the goals sought to be obtained or the obligations imposed by the
federal law reveal a purpose to preclude state authority. 245
Like the problems of characterization or classification which are so often
238See Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. at 634 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322
U.S. 292. 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)). See also Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 212 (state
regulation of nuclear power plant safety is not preempted "only when it conflicts with federal law. Rather,
the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited
powers expressly ceded to the States.") (labeled dictum by the concurring justices). The comparisons to
the field of merchant vessels, documented and inspected by the Coast Guard, operated by persons tested
and licensed by the Coast Guard, and often under the control of a vessel traffic service similar in many
respects to air traffic control, is apparent.239See Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 718, and California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 737 (1949) (observing
that "one would expect the agency to be specific if it intended to supersede state laws.").2401d. See also California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987) (agency
regulations did not preempt state regulatory authority where they did not specifically express preemptive
intent).241See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607, 609-10 & n.4 (1991); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527
(1978).242See Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
24 3Mortier, 501 U.S. at 605.
244Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (leaving open the question whether "the federal power
in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive."); Mortier, 510 U.S. at 605; Hillsborough,
471 U.S. at 719.24 5See Mortier, 501 U.S. at 604-05 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and Pacific Gas
& Elec., 461 U.S. at 204 (citations omitted).
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a source of mischief in conflicts of law questions in private law, 24 6
determining the "subject" or "purpose" of federal and state law in a
preemption analysis can prove vexing.247 Nonetheless, such a determination
is essential under traditional preemption analysis. In classifying federal
legislation for preemption analysis the Court has variously referred to the
legislation's "subject," 248 its "matter," 249 the "subject matter," 250 the "field,"
the "area,"'251 and its "purpose. '252 Unlike state legislation, which in most
states may not constitutionally embrace more than one subject or object,2 53
federal legislation often does. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (which will be
discussed in Part II of this article) is a noteworthy example of a federal act
with multiple subjects and purposes. Few would dispute that characterizing
246E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflicts of Law § 3.5, at 55 (2d ed. 1992) (observing that characterization
is sometimes used in choice of law analysis as a "gimmick" to get around undesirable results). In his
concurring opinion in American Dredging, Justice Souter accepts the majority's "substantive-procedural"
characterization in determining whether the application of state law will disrupt the harmony and
uniformity of the general maritime law, but points out that "[als to those close cases, how a given rule
is characterized for purposes of determining whether federal maritime law pre-empts state law will turn
on whether the state rule unduly interferes with the federal interest in maintaining the free flow of
maritime commerce." American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 458, 1994 AMC 913 (1994)
(Souter, J., concurring).247See Hines, 312 U.S. at 78-79 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("Every act of Congress occupies some field,
but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has precluded a state from the
exercise of any power reserved to it by the Constitution.") (emphasis added). Problems with
characterization in the context of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis are discussed in G. Gunther &
K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 337-38 (13th ed. 1997).248See Hines, 312 U.S. at 61 ("the basic subject of the state and federal laws is identical") (emphasis
added), and Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439, 446, 448 (1915) (the
exclusive effect of the federal statute "did not relate merely to the details of the statute and the penalties
it imposed, but extended to the whole subject of equipping cars with appliances intended for the
protection of employees.") (emphasis added).249Rice. 331 U.S. at 235 (the test is "whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is
in any way regulated by the Federal Act.") (emphasis added).250Charleston & W. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915) (per Holmes, J.)
("When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as
opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go further than Congress
has seen fit to go.") (emphasis added).25 1Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 712 ("even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation
in a specific area .. ") (emphasis added).252Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("it is suggested that
whether the coexistence of federal and state regulatory legislation should depend upon whether the
purposes of the two laws are parallel or divergent.") (emphasis in original). Shifting the focus, the Court
in the same opinion later held:
The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give
way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of
the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives.
Id. at 142 (emphasis added). In its next substantive section, however, the Court focused its attention on
the "nature of the subject matter." Id. at 143.253See IA Singer, supra note 216, at § 17.01 ("41 state constitutions provide that an act shall not
embrace more than one subject or object.").
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the subject or purpose of an entire title of the United States Code which has
been enacted into positive law, such as the Title 46 (or, even worse, Title
33), is likely to generate disagreement. 254 The Supreme Court has offered
some guidance on the importance of the legislation's "subject" or "object"
in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.2 55 In examining its prior cases which upheld
state regulation of vessels that had been inspected and found to be in
compliance with federal safety regulations the Court noted that
in none of the relevant cases sustaining the application of state laws to
federally licensed or inspected vessels did the federal licensing or inspection
procedure implement a substantive rule of federal law addressed to the object
also sought to be addressed by the challenged state regulations.2 56
The Court went on to point out that in its decision in Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit the majority opinion had "made it plain that there was
no overlap between the scope of the federal inspection laws and that of the
municipal ordinances. ' 257 In reaching its conclusio'n that' the federal and
state statutes did not overlap the Court in Huron focused on the purpose of
the statutes. 258 Similarly, the Court noted that, in upholding the state motor
tugboat safety regulations at issue in Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co.,
the Court concluded that the state regulations addressed matters (a class of
vessels) not touched by federal regulations. 259 Such was not the case in the
Tanker Law at issue in Ray. In Ray the Court found that the federal scheme
aims "precisely at the same ends as does" the Washington statute.260 The
Court's focus on the purpose of the legislation was reaffirmed in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, in which the Court noted that "the purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case." 261 To determine the purpose
or intent of Congress the court looks to the text of the statute, the framework
254The effect of code titles enacted into positive law is analyzed in Five Flags Pipe Line Co. v.
Department of Transp., 854 F.2d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
255435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
2561d. at 164 (emphasis added). See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1941) ("the basic
subject of the state and federal act is identical"), and New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
107 U.S. (17 Otto) 59, 63 (1883) (where state and federal law cover the same ground state law must
yield).2 57Ray, 435 U.S. at 164 (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446, 1960
AMC 1549 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In their dissent in Huron, Justices Frankfurter and
Douglas disagreed in the majority's conclusion that there was no overlap. See 362 U.S. at 449
(Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
2 58Ray, 435 U.S. at 164.2591d. at 164-65. The Court noted that the state was therefore "[rlefusing to accept the federal
judgment" that vessels which met the federal requirements were safe by attempting to exclude those
vessels from state waters. Id. at 165.
2601d. at 165 (emphasis added).
26 1116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted and emphasis added).
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surrounding it, and the court's understanding of the way in which Congress
intended the statute and its associated regulatory scheme to affect business
and the law. 262
State laws intended to supplement federal law by creating new or more
stringent requirements than those established by federal law are preempted
if federal law occupies the field. 263 If the federal government occupies a
given field or an identifiable portion of it the test of preemption is whether
the matter on which the state asserts the right to act is "in any way regulated
by the Federal Act. '12 64 Moreover, even if the state legislation is fully
consistent with federal law, the Court may hold that state authority is
preempted if the state's act intrudes on foreign commerce. 265 When the
federal government has enacted a complete scheme of regulation the "states
cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere
with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or
auxiliary regulations. '2 66 If federal law occupies a given field, state laws on
the same subject are preempted even before the effective date of the federal
regulations. 267 And a federal decision to forgo regulation on a given subject
may imply a federal determination that the subject is best left unregulated,
in which case the states are preempted from imposing their own regulations
on the subject. 268 Applying its preemption formula the Supreme Court struck
down a Georgia statute which, for safety reasons, required railroad locomo-
tives to have automatic doors on the fire boxes, on the ground that federal
legislation had occupied the field of railroad safety.2 69 Later decisions by the
Court held that the federal government has occupied the field of common
262 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
263 See Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (holding that when Congress has preempted the
field, "complementary state legislation is as fatal as state regulations which conflict with the federal
scheme.").
264pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
212-13 (1983) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In that case the Court concluded that
federal law completely occupied the field of nuclear power plant safety, but that a state could nevertheless
ban nuclear plants if it had a non-safety rationale for doing so. Id. at 216. If the state had a non-safety
rationale, the state legislation was held to be outside the occupied field of nuclear safety regulation. Id.265See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 n.7 (1984) ("The need for a
consistent and coherent foreign policy, which is the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government,
enhances the necessity that congressional authorization not be lightly implied.").
266Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).267See Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914).268See Arkansas Elec. Co-op Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983).269Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 612 (1926). Justice Brandeis wrote the opinion
for a unanimous Court. Later, he would report in a letter to Justice Frankfurter that he had "endeavored
in the opinion to make the 'occupying the field' doctrine clear as a matter of statutory construction."
Letter from Louis Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 30, 1926), reprinted in 5 Letters of Louis D.
Brandeis 247 (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1975).
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carrier liability,270 regulation of air carriers, 271 nuclear power plant safety, 272
and construction and design requirements and safety standards for tank
vessels. 2
73
Congress may limit the preemptive effect of federal legislation by
inserting state law saving clauses into its statutes. 274 Such saving clauses are
now common,275 though they are not always models of clarity. As with
statutory preemption provisions, saving clauses often require the court to
determine the "domain" covered; that is, the scope of the state law which
Congress intended to save.276 Generally, saving clauses are strictly con-
strued.277 In Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire27 8 one of the leading
admiralty decisions construing the Death on the High Sea Act, the Supreme
Court read the state law saving clause in that statute narrowly; in the words
of one commentator "torturing" the clause to "save" the statute.279 Similarly,
in its 1976 decision in Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, International
Union v. Mobil Oil Corp.,280 which involved a challenge to application of a
Texas right-to-work statute to tankers operating on the high seas off the
Texas coast, the Court narrowly construed the saving clause in federal labor
laws, thus limiting application of state law.2 8'
c. Conflict Supersession
If a court determines that relevant federal laws do not expressly or
impliedly preempt state authority, it will next look at whether the state law
270See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1913) (holding that the Carmack
Amendment, as national law, is paramount to and supersedes all state laws as to the rights and liabilities
of carriers).27 1See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1995), and City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973).272See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 212-13 (1983) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).273See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163-64, 174 1978 AMC 527 (1978).274See 1 A Sutherland, supra note 216, § 20.22, at I10 ("The saving clause is said to preserve from
destruction certain rights, remedies or privileges which would otherwise be destroyed by the general
enactment.") (citations omitted). See also id. at § 21.12 (saving clauses are generally employed to restrict
repealing acts).275See J. Nowak & R. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 9.1, at 319 (5th ed. 1995).276Cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2243 (1996) (court must "identify the domain
expressly preempted" by the preemption clause) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
517 (1992)).277See IA Singer, supra note 216, § 20.22, at 110 (citations omitted).
278477 U.S. 207, 1986 AMC 2113 (1986).
279Ruhl, Finding Federalism in the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess" Revisited, 12 Tul. Mar. L.J.
263, 286-90 (1988).
2'04 2 6 U.S. 407 (1976).
281The saving clause at issue was in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), which expressly allowed "agency shop"
agreements, and 29 U.S.C. § 164(b).
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under challenge actually conflicts with a valid federal statute, treaty, or
federal agency-promulgated regulation.282 If the state law frustrates the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress, 283 or if it is impossible to comply with both state and federal laws
at the same time, 284 the state law will be held to conflict with federal law,
and will thus be invalidated by operation of the Supremacy Clause.285 A
state statute may also be held to be preempted by federal law when the
incompatibility between them is discernible only through inference. 286
In conducting a conflict analysis the court must consider the relationship
between state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not
merely as they are written. 287 If the state act prevents or hinders the federal
act from operating as Congress intended, the state law will be held to be in
conflict with the federal law and therefore superseded. 288 In cases conduct-
ing an analysis into a potential conflict between the federal and state law, the
courts do not apply the presumption against preemption relevant in implied
preemption analyses. 28 9 Where the federal statute establishes a "regulatory
partnership between federal, state, and local governments," the Court is less
likely to find that the state regulation frustrates the purposes and objectives
of the federal law.290 Although the danger of a conflict between enforcement
of state laws and the administration of the federal program has persuaded the
Court to invalidate state law in some circumstances, 29' the Court is reluctant
to imagine possible conflicts not presented in the case, 292 or to entertain
arguments concerning speculative conflicts. 293
282Cf Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
283See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190 (1983), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (holding that the federal Alien Registration Act
preempts state regulation of aliens).
284See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).285See id.
286See Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 861 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013 (1992) (citing
Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622, 626-28 (1984)).
287See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (citations omitted).
288See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1997 AMC 1921 (11 th Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S.
Ct. 439 (1997).289See id. (citation omitted).
29°Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614-15 (1991).
29 1See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956).29 2See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 736 (1949) (declining to predicate its decision on
"Constitutional difficulties not present in the cause before us"), and Barber v. Hawai'i, 42 F.3d 1185,
1189, 1995 AMC 1763 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We will consider future conflicts as they arise ... ").293See Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 722 (1985), and
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973).
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d. Preemption by Federal Maritime Law
Congress has highlighted the nation's "long history of preemption in
maritime safety matters ... founded on the need for uniformity applicable
to vessels moving in interstate commerce. ' 294 The constitutional limits on
state regulatory authority over merchant vessel safety and pollution preven-
tion parallel the limits on the application of state law in private law cases
arising under the federal Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Clause.2 95 In
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, the seminal case establishing the rule of
uniformity in private admiralty litigation, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the origins of its holding in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence
under Cooley.2 9 6 Although a majority of the current members of the Court
seem ready to overrule Jensen in a proper case, 2 97 even Justice Stevens, the
most outspoken critic of Jensen on the present Court, has stated his
continuing allegiance to an approach to maritime federalism which scruti-
nizes the application of state law in admiralty cases under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. 298 A review of the leading Commerce Clause
and Admiralty Clause choice of law cases demonstrates that the public
policy goal underlying the Constitution's delegation of both subject areas to
the national government is virtually identical: the national interest in
providing the needed degree of uniformity in laws governing foreign and
294S. Rep. No. 92-248 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1341.
295The Third Circuit noted in Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622, 629 n.8, 1995
AMC I (3d Cir. 1994), af'd, 516 U.S. 199, 1996 AMC 305 (1996), that the analogy is not perfect. In
the private admiralty and maritime law area, the Supreme Court has twice held that Congress may not
constitutionally delegate its legislative responsibilities to the states, as it can under the Commerce Clause.
Compare Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1920), and Washington v. W.C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-28, 1924 AMC 403 (1924) (both holding that Congress may not
delegate its legislative authority over maritime law to the states) with Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138
(1986) (holding that "[iut is well established that Congress may authorize States to engage in regulation
that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid"). As earlier discussed, the Court may find state
authority preempted with respect to safety regulations, but not with respect to tort liability. See supra note
210 (contrasting the Court's decisions in Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood).
296244 U.S. 205, 216-17, 1996 AMC 2076 (1917) (explaining that a "similar rule in respect to
interstate commerce, deduced from the grant to Congress of power to regulate it, is now firmly
established ... [a]nd the same character of reasoning which supports this rule, we think, makes
imperative the stated limitation upon the power of the states to interpose where maritime matters are
involved.") (citations omitted).297 See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447 n.I, 1994 AMC 913 (1994) ("we think
it inappropriate to overrule Jensen in dictum, and without argument or even invitation.").2981d. at 441-42 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("we should recognize that, today, the federal interests in
free trade and uniformity are amply protected by" means other than the Jensen maritime preemption
analysis ..."state laws that affect maritime commerce, interstate and foreign, are subject to judicial
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause."). Justice Souter expressed a similar concern that the preemption
analysis should turn on whether application of state law would unduly interfere with the federal interest
in maintaining the free flow of maritime commerce. Id. at 458.
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interstate trade and transportation. 299 In examining the roots of the federal
admiralty jurisdiction, Justice Story quoted Federalist No. 80, which argued
that maritime cases "so generally depend on the law of nations, and so
commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the consider-
ations which are relative to the public peace. ' 300 Later, he noted that "this
class of cases has, or may have, an intimate relation to the rights and duties
of foreigners in navigation and maritime commerce. It may materially affect
our intercourse with foreign states; and raise many questions of international
law, not merely touching private claims, but national sovereignty and
national reciprocity."30'
The federal power over admiralty and maritime matters is said to be
exclusive in all cases where the federal interest in promoting maritime
shipping and commerce requires a uniform national system, plan, or
regulation-even if Congress has not spoken.302 Accordingly, state laws
affecting admiralty and maritime matters, even where not in conflict with
federal law, will be struck down if the law concerns a subject matter which
demands a uniform national rule. In contrast, the Court will generally uphold
state legislation if the state was exercising its inherent police power over a
subject matter that is "maritime but local"; 303 that is, over a matter that does
not require a uniform national rule, but rather is better suited to multiple
299The Court's historical position is articulated in W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. at 228, in which the
Court struck down a state statute while observing:
The confusion and difficulty, if vessels were compelled to comply with the local statutes at every
port, are not difficult to see. Of course, some within the States may prefer local rules; but the Union
was formed with the very definite design of freeing maritime commerce from intolerable
restrictions incident to such control. The subject is national. Local interests must yield to the
common welfare. The Constitution is supreme.
See also Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 15, 1937 AMC 1490 (1937) (expressing
concern for varying state regulations of vessel safety). Two recent opinions from the Court cast doubt on
the extent to which concern for maritime commerce lies at the heart of federal admiralty jurisdiction and
choice of law. See American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 452 n.3 ("Whatever might be the unifying theme of
[the federal-state choice of law] aspect of our admiralty jurisprudence, it assuredly is not what the dissent
takes it to be, namely, the principle that the States may not impair maritime commerce.") (emphasis in
original). Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, goes on to point out that the "no-harm-to-commerce
theme" is part of the "negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence." Id. See also Jerome B. Grubart, Inc.
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 546-47 n.6, 1995 AMC 913 (1995) ("It is true that
this Court has said that 'the primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably the protection of
maritime commerce ... [h]owever that may be, this Court has never limited the interest in question to
the 'protection of maritime commerce through uniform rules of decision."') (citations omitted).3
°°The Federalist No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
3 0lStory, supra note 48, at § 1664.30 2See Kelly, 302 U.S. at 14-15, and Harman v. City of Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893).3 03See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973), and
Palestina v. Fernandez, 701 F.2d 438, 1984 AMC 910 (5th Cir. 1983).
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rules adapted to local necessities. The interest in uniformity is greater when
the activities regulated occur on the high seas. 3°4
e. Preemption by International Law
Article VI of the Constitution imbues treaties with preemptive "law of the
land" status.305 International law sources other than treaties are accorded
similar status under the Court's construction of Article VI. Such sources
include international agreements entered into by the President and interna-
tional law established other than by treaty. 30 6 Arguably, Article VI also
extends to established practices by the United States government based not
on an obligation imposed by treaty or other international law but rather those
founded on principles of international comity. 30 7
Customary international law, or "the law of nations," is part of the law of
the land in the United States. 30 8 It is self-executing and ordinarily does not
require implementation by Congress. 30 9 Within the United States federal
courts determine the content and effect of international law and their
decisions are binding on state courts.310 The courts go about their law-
3
°4See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 492 n.2, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985).30 5See Restatement, supra note 19, at § Ill n.2. Benjamin Franklin was responsible for adding the
phrase "or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union" to the draft supremacy clause which
eventually formed Article VI. See Madison, supra note 62, Thursday, May 31, 1787, at 44.306 1n describing the content of the "foreign relations law" of the United States, the Restatement
includes international agreements and international law. "International law," in turn, includes customary
international law and widely accepted multi-lateral agreements. See Restatement, supra note 19, at
introductory note to Chapter 2.
3071d. at § 101 cmt. e. Comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere courtesy and good
will. It is the recognition that one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience. Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Without identifying the principle of comity by name, District Judge
Charles L. Brieant recently described it succinctly. "Each nation which considered itself a maritime
power understood that it had to treat traders fairly because some day its own ships would be under arrest
in the ports of those traders." Brieant, Professionalism, Civility, and the Maritime Bar: A View From the
Bench, 28 J. Mar. L. & Com. 551, 552 (1997).30 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdictions, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
388, 423 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.); Restatement, supra note 19, at § 111(1). But see Bradley & Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 849-70 (1997) (criticizing the
"modern position" that customary international law is "federal law").3
°9Foreign Affairs, supra note 67, at 236.31
°See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964). But see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 308, at 870 (arguing that federal court decisions on customary international law
are not binding on the states or on the legislative and executive branches). Federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 extends to questions of international law. See Restatement, supra note 19, at §
111(2) & cmts. d & e. Where, however, the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on a subject,
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finding process by, among other means, "consulting the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law." 311
International agreements entered into by the President without the advice
and consent of the Senate have been upheld, 312 and such agreements preempt
state law to the same extent as would a treaty, without regard to whether they
are self-executing. 313 Indeed, international law and even some acts of
Congress do not distinguish between treaties and executive agreements.
314
In contrast to customary international law and executive agreements, the
preemptive force of which does not require a determination of whether they
are self-executing, the preemptive force of a treaty in United States domestic
law may turn on such a determination. A self-executing treaty, when
proclaimed, or a non-self-executing treaty, when implemented by an act of
Congress, is federal law and supersedes state law.315 Self-executing treaties
are "law of the land" without further legislation.316 Treaties which are not
self-executing do not become law of the land unless implemented by the
legislative or executive branches. Interestingly, in at least one circumstance,
a treaty affecting maritime matters was implemented by the Supreme Court
by incorporating the treaty into the general maritime law. In Warren v.
United States, the Supreme Court enforced provisions of the Shipowner's
Liability Convention 317 notwithstanding Congress's failure to act. 31 8 The
Court's recognition of the unique relationship between international mari-
state courts arguably are not obliged to follow lower court opinions. See id. at § 112 cmt. a, and Foreign
Affairs, supra note 67, at 409 n.17.3 11See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820), and Restatement, supra note
19, at §§ 102, 103 & 112.3 12See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
330-31 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); Restatement,
supra note 19, at § 303(2)-(4) & cmt. a & illus. 1. Such Executive Agreements must be transmitted to the
Congress within 60 days. See I U.S.C. § 112b and 22 C.F.R. pt. 181 (1997). The criteria followed by the
Department of State in determining which form of international agreement is appropriate for a given
subject are listed in 11 Foreign Relations Manual 720 (Dep't State 1985).3 13See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-331; Curtiss-Wright Export, 315 U.S. at 230-32; Aerovias
Inter-Americanas de Panama, S.A v. Board of County Comm'ners of Dade County, 197 F. Supp. 230
(S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1963);
Restatement, supra note 19, at §§ 111, 144(l).3 14Cf. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 n.5 & 30-31 (1982).
3 15See Foreign Affairs, supra note 67, at 476 n.95. See also Answers of the Maritime Law Association
of the United States to the Comitd Maritime International's Questionnaire on Implementation of
International Conventions, reprinted in 18 J. Mar. L. & Com. 589 (1987).3 16See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). A self-executing treaty is applicable as
federal law ex proprio vigore.
31754 Stat. 1693 (Sept. 29, 1939).
3 18See 340 U.S. 523, 1951 AMC 416 (1951) (holding that relevant treaty provisions are "operative
by virtue of maritime law and that no Act of Congress is necessary to give them force.").
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time conventions and the general maritime law was reaffirmed in 1975 in
Vella v. Ford Motor Company.31 9
The importance of whether a treaty is self-executing in an analysis of the
treaty's preemptive effect was first established by the Supreme Court in
Foster v. Neilson.320 In that case, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that
under Article VI treaties are the law of the land, and that a treaty is to be
regarded by the courts as equivalent to an act of the legislature whenever it
operates on its own force without the aid of implementing legislation.321
Absent implementing legislation by Congress, however, a treaty that is not
self-executing "addresses itself to the political, not the judicial depart-
ment, '322 and is therefore not enforceable in court. Generally, it is up to the
offended nation to protest treaty violations: if there is no claim from the
signatory nation to a treaty, a private person from that nation lacks standing
to challenge the actions of another party. 323
The standard for determining whether a treaty is self-executing is
unsettled; however, a number of guiding principles have emerged. 324 There
3"9421 U.S. 1, 1975 AMC 563 (1975) (holding that the United States has an international obligation
to enforce the treaty).
32027 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51,
89 (1833). Although Neilson was overruled on its application to the specific treaty at issue, the Supreme
Court preserved the definition of self-executing treaties under United States law. See Restatement, supra
note 19, at § 111(3) & n.5.321See 27 U.S. at 314; Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 695
(1995); L. Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 66 (1990) [hereinafter Constitu-
tionalism] (criticizing the modem trend to interpret treaties as non-self-executing). See also Vazquez, The
Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 695 (1995). But see Baghdadi, Apples and
Oranges-The Supremacy Clause and the Determination of Self-Executing Treaties: A Response to
Professor Vazquez, 20 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 701, 702 (1997) (criticizing Vazquez's conclusion
that a treaty that is not self-executing cannot preempt state law). In its ruling on Intertanko's preemption
challenge, the district court held that "[a] treaty cannot [ I have any impact on domestic laws unless it
is self-executing, or unless its terms are enacted as parts of statutes or administrative regulations."
International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1490 n.3, 1997
AMC 512 (W.D. Wash. 1996), appeal docketed sub. nom. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners
(Intertanko) v. Locke (9th Cir. No. 97-35010) (citation omitted). In its appeal, the United States
Department of Justice has taken the position that whether a treaty is self-executing "is not relevant to
whether the treaty has the negative effect of preempting inconsistent state law." Reply Brief for
Intervenor-Appellant United States, International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke,
at 28 (9th Cir. No. 97-35010). Both may be right. The United States was not a party in the case in the
district court. It intervened only on appeal. The position of Intertanko, as a private litigant in the court
below, is arguably constrained by the rule articulated by the district court. By contrast, the Executive
Branch may challenge a state statute on the ground that it is displaced by an international agreement to
which the United States is party without regard to whether the agreement is self-executing.
322Neilson, 27 U.S. at 314.323See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988).324 See generally IA Singer, supra note 216, § 32.01, at 552, and Restatement, supra note 19, at §
111(4).
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is a strong presumption that any given treaty is self-executing. 325 That a
treaty is self-executing may be apparent from the text.326 The intent of the
parties to the treaty will also be considered. Within the United States, the
understanding and intent of the President and the Senate in entering into
the treaty is a key factor in determining whether a treaty to which the United
States is party is self-executing. If the President does not request that
Congress enact legislation implementing a treaty, and Congress has not
enacted such legislation, there is a presumption that the treaty has been
considered self-executing by the political branches, and that it should
therefore be considered self-executing by the courts. 327 Agreements which
can readily be given effect by executive or judicial bodies without further
legislation are deemed self-executing unless a contrary intention is mani-
fest.328 Obligations imposed by a treaty to refrain from an act, or to act only
subject to limitations, are generally deemed self-executing. 329 Thus if the
terms of the treaty declare rules which limit the actions of the signatory
nations, those limiting provisions are subject to judicial enforcement. 330
Finally, even an international agreement by the United States which is not
self-executing may give rise to a preemption challenge if a state regulation
interferes with the foreign policy of the United States, as reflected in the
international agreement. State laws which would frustrate the objectives
underlying an international agreement to which the United States is party are
preempted. 331 The effect to be given such international agreements turns on
the "purposes and objectives" of the national government in entering into the
international agreements. 332
Because treaties to which the United States is party are not only the
325See Foreign Affairs, supra note 67, at 201.326See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, entered
into force Jan. 1, 1988, U.N. Doc. AICONF.97/18 (1980).327See Restatement, supra note 19, at § Ill n.5.
32 5See id.329See Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. 697, 702-03 (1878), cited by the Supreme Court as a "very
able" statement of the law in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1886). But see United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 1980 AMC 1651 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). In Postal,
the Fifth Circuit held that Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, which limits boarding authority
by nations other than the flag State while the vessel is on the high seas, was not self-executing.
Accordingly, it was not a defense in a criminal trial in federal court for conspiracy to import marijuana
that the court lacked jurisdiction over the defendants on the grounds that the boarding leading to their
arrest was made in violation of Article 6. The decision has been criticized. See Riesenfeld, The Doctrine
of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 892 (1980), and Note,
United States v. Postal: Lost on the High Seas, 31 Mercer L. Rev. 1081 (1980).330See United States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979), and
Watson v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Wash. 1983).331See Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 68, 1993 AMC 2318 (1993) (citing
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
332See id. at 69-70.
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supreme law of the land, but also an agreement among sovereign powers, the
court in construing a treaty considers its text, drafting history (travaux
preparatoires), and the post-ratification understanding of the contracting
parties. 333 And in interpreting treaties the federal courts will attempt to
determine and enforce the intent of the parties. 334 However, in analyzing
whether international agreements evince a policy with which a state
regulation arguably interferes, a court will look not at the "aspirations"
contained in the treaties, but the law actually established by those treaties. 335
An interpretation of a treaty by the political branches of the government is
not conclusive, but the courts accord such determinations due weight. 336
No fixed formula yet exists for determining the circumstances under
which state law will be displaced by an international agreement. 337 In
conducting its preemption analysis of state regulation touching on interna-
tional relations, the Court has held that any concurrent power the states may
have in the field of foreign affairs "is restricted to its narrowest limits." 338
Where the federal government has exercised its authority on behalf of the
nation as a whole, a state "cannot refuse to give foreign nationals their treaty
rights because of fear that valid international agreements might possibly not
work completely to the satisfaction of state authorities." 339 Nor may a state
attempt to add to or take from the force and effect of a treaty. 340 State action
will be preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. It is, accordingly,
of importance in any preemption analysis to determine whether the state
legislation touches on a field which affects international relations, "the one
33 3See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 1996 AMC 319 (1996).334 See Lemnitzer v. Philippine Airlines, 783 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1991).33 5See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (examining a number
of international agreements on civil aviation).336 See Restatement, supra note 19, at § 112 cmt. c; Heilbronn v. Kendall, 775 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.
Mich. 1991); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 195-96 (1983). The Court is
not above rejecting the position of the Executive Branch. See, e.g., Wardair, 477 U.S. at 10-11 (rejecting
the United States's argument that a "Resolution" of the International Civil Aviation Organization
demonstrated a national policy to exempt aviation fuel from state taxes after observing that "the
Resolution is formally merely the work product of an international organization of which the United
States is a member; it has not been specifically endorsed, let alone signed, entered into, agreed upon,
approved, or passed by either the Executive or Legislative Branch of the Federal Government. In other
words, no action has been taken to give the Resolution the force of law.").3371tel, 507 U.S. at 66-67.
338Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941).339 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 198 (1961).
34 0See Hines, 312 U.S. at 63. The Court explained that "our system of government is such that the
interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation,
imperatively requires that the federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free
from local interference." Id.
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aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally
conceded to demand broad national authority." 34'
The leading Supreme Court decisions reviewing the validity of state laws
affecting the nation's foreign affairs often fail to make clear whether the
Court's holding was grounded on a finding of preemption by international
law or on the Court's perception that the state's action interfered with the
federal government's exclusive power to conduct foreign affairs. 342 For
example, in United States v. Belmont, the Court framed a preemption
challenge as "a question of public concern, the determination of which well
might involve the good faith of the United States in the eyes of a foreign
government." 343 Five years later, in United States v. Pink,3 4 the Court
repeated its concern over the impact of state laws on the national govern-
ment's ability to conduct foreign relations, urging that "if state laws and
policies did not yield to the exercise of the external powers of the United
States, then our foreign policy might be thwarted. These are delicate matters.
If state action could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences
might ensue." 345 Both cases highlight the close relationship between the
need to give effect to international law and the conduct of the nation's
foreign affairs.
Treaties and federal statutes or regulations on the same subject but
enacted at different times present questions regarding which of those
authorities constitutes the current "law of the land." Courts begin with the
maxim that acts of Congress should not be construed to conflict with the
nation's international treaty obligations. 346 For purposes of domestic law,
a statute can supersede a treaty and a self-executing treaty can repeal an
earlier statute.347 The relationship between international agreements and
federal statutes was defined by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions
beginning with Edye v. Robertson.348 In that decision the Court held that a
treaty's incorporation into the domestic laws of the United States is subject to
34 1Id. at 67-68.
342 In Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), for example, the Court was called upon to determine
whether Oregon's application of its escheat statute to an East German heir conflicted with the 1923
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States and Germany.
Particularly troubling to Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion for the plurality, was the fact that various
states had "launched inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign nations." Id.
at 433-34.
143301 U.S. 324, 327 (1937).
344315 U.S. 203 (1942).
345 1d. at 232.
346 5ee Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996).
347This follows the principle of lex posterior derogat prior. See Foreign Affairs, supra note 67, at 96.
341112 U.S. 580 (1884).
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subsequent modification or supersession by Congress.3 4 9 The principle was best
stated by the Court in Whitney v. Robertson:
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to
be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over
the other, when the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always
endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done
without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one
last in date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty
on the subject is self-executing.3 50
Thus Congress can, by subsequently-enacted legislation, override the effect
of an international agreement in United States domestic law, but the courts
will not infer such an intent. Rather, such intent must be clearly expressed.
For example, in Cook v. United States,35 1 the Court construed a statutory
provision for boarding vessels which had been enacted after a series of
liquor treaties with Great Britain. Finding no express intent in the statute to
supersede the liquor treaties, the Court declined to find the treaties were
superseded as a matter of domestic law.
In implementing a treaty Congress may provide for continued supremacy
of United States domestic law by including appropriate provisions in the
implementing legislation. 352 Conversely, the Court has established "a firm
and obviously sound canon of construction" against finding implicit repeal
of a treaty in ambiguous congressional action.353 Thus, legislative silence is
not sufficient to abrogate the effect of a treaty on United States domestic
law. No similar canon of construction operates to avoid possible conflict
between a treaty and state legislation. 354
349See id. at 599. The subsequent Congressional action does not, however, affect the United States's
obligation under international law. See Restatement, supra note 19, at note 2 to the Preface and § 311(3)
& cmt. c, and Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 221, at arts. 46 & 47.
350124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
"5'288 U.S. 102 (1933).352See, e.g., the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3512) (providing that "[n]o provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law
of the United States shall have effect."). Such a statutory "supremacy clause" should, of course, be
accompanied by the entry of a corresponding reservation to the underlying treaty or convention. See, e.g.,
the reservation of the United States to Article 1 (1)(b) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (1980), 132 Cong. Rec. S15882 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986) (reservation
against application of the Convention "when the rules of private international law lead to the application
of the law of a Contracting State," as permitted under Article 95).353Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,252, 1984 AMC 1817 (1984). See
also Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 Vand.
L. Rev. 1103 (1990), and Fenton, supra note 66.354See Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929).
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Although the Supreme Court has created a presumption against preemp-
tion of state statutes grounded in the state's police powers, 355 the Court has
not applied the presumption in cases involving a conflict between a state
statute and an international agreement. 356 In Missouri v. Holland,357 the
leading case on the preemptive effect of international agreements on state
law, the Court never hinted that the state's laws were entitled to a
presumption against preemption in the face of the treaty, even though the
subject matter of the controversy (regulation of waterfowl hunting) fell
squarely within the states's historic police powers. The Court has also
adopted as a canon of construction the principle that an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.358 The principle has been applied to avoid construing
a statute in a manner contrary to State Department regulations or to
established rules of international law.359
In examining the relationship between statutes and international agree-
ments as they relate to United States domestic law, it is important to bear in
mind the wholly distinct question of the nation's obligation as a matter of
international law. Under international law every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith (the norm
of pacta sunt servanda). 360 A party may not invoke provisions of its internal,
domestic law as a justification for failing to perform its treaty obligations. 361
Whether or not a treaty is considered self-executing has no effect on the
United States' obligation under international law. 362 Recognizing that,
notwithstanding the subsequent legislation, the United States will still be
obliged under international law to abide by its treaty obligations, the
Supreme Court has left such concerns to the executive and legislative
branches of government. 363
355See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
356See McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron? Presumption and Deference in Regulatory
Preemption, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 823 (1995).
357252 U.S. 416 (1920).
358See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988);
Restatement, supra note 19, at §§ 114-15. The Charming Betsy canon of construction has continued
vitality. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).359Sce Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-21, 1963 AMC 283 (1963)).
36°See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 221, at art. 26.
361See id. at art. 27, and Greco-Bulgarian Communities, 1930 P.C.I.J. Rep. ser. B, no. 17, at 32 (ruling
that it is a generally accepted principle of international law that in the relations between powers who are
contracting parties to a treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty).
See also Constitutionalism, supra note 321, at 62-64.362See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 221, at arts. 26 & 27.
363See Constitutionalism, supra note 321, at 194-95.
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C. Foreign Affiirs Clause Limits on State Authority
The Supreme Court has long recognized that although governmental
power over internal affairs is shared between the national and state
governments, the power over external affairs is vested exclusively in the
national government. 364 As earlier discussed, the federal government's
primacy in the conduct of the nation's foreign relations is maintained
through several related doctrines. First, as a matter of constitutional
competency, states and their subdivisions may not enter into treaties or
alliances. Second, if a state law conflicts with a treaty, or undermines
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of the federal govern-
ment in entering into such an agreement, the state law must yield under the
Supremacy Clause. Third, even in the absence of a treaty, a state's policy
may disturb foreign relations, 365 and therefore infringe on the exclusively
federal domain.
State laws may be struck down as violative of the Foreign Affairs Clause
even though they do not intrude on a field occupied by federal law or
conflict with federal law. 366 The Court will scrutinize state actions chal-
lenged under the Foreign Affairs Clause to determine whether they may
have a direct impact upon foreign relations, or they could adversely affect
the ability of the central government to deal with those problems. 367
Similarly, the Court will scrutinize state actions which may impair the good
faith of the United States in the eyes of a foreign government, 368 or
undermine the ability of the federal government to "speak with one voice"
in its conduct of foreign affairs. 369 For example, in response to a Foreign
Affairs Clause challenge to the Washington Tanker Law at issue in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., the Supreme Court concluded that any state attempt
to coerce foreign vessel owners to comply with state tanker design
requirements might constitute an "invalid interference" with the Federal
Government's attempt to achieve international agreement on the regulation
of tanker design. 370 Similarly, in reviewing Alaska regulations restricting the
discharge of ballast water from tank vessels while in Alaskan waters, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged the necessity to consider whether the potential
364See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).365See Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968). Professor Henkin warns that "[o]ne would be
bold to predict that [Zschernig] has a future life. Foreign Affairs, supra note 67, at 165 n.**.366Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
3671d. at 441.
368See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327.
369 japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449, 1979 AMC 881 (1979) (quoting
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
370435 U.S. 151, 162-63, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
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effect of the challenged state statute on international matters gave rise to a
"preemptive federal interest."'37'
State laws affecting foreign commerce may directly disrupt the nation's
foreign affairs. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,372
Justice Brennan, writing for a five member majority, identified as the most
obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax on foreign commerce "the
threat it might pose of offending our foreign trading partners and leading
them to retaliate against the Nation as a whole." 373 Although the majority in
that case upheld the state tax on containers used to carry cargo on merchant
vessels, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor, dissented on the ground that the tax "clearly violates the Foreign
Affairs Clause." 374 Noting that the federal government had already received
protests from its principal trading partners, 375 the dissent expressed its
concern for international retaliation. 376
State actions which are likely to provoke retaliatory actions by a foreign
nation raise serious foreign affairs powers questions-as the Founders
well-knew. Whether state action undermines the foreign affairs of the nation
is generally a question for the President and Congress, whose judgments are
binding on the judiciary. 377 In determining the validity of a state law
affecting resident aliens, the Supreme Court observed that "[e]xperience has
shown that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes
even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrong to another's
subjects, inflicted, or permitted, by a government. ' 378 Real or imagined
wrongs to a nation's merchant vessels may provoke similar reactions.
Concerns for the national government's ability to defend the nation and
conduct its foreign affairs informed the Court's decision in United States v.
California, in which the Court denied the state's claim to the waters and
submerged lands within the territorial sea.379 Even as Congress quitclaimed
title to the submerged lands and waters of the territorial sea and the internal
37
'Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 493, 1984 AMC 1027 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1140, 1985 AMC 2395 (1985).
372463 U.S. 159 (1983).
373Id. at 194 (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450).3741d. at 197.3751d. at 203 n.4.
3761d. at 203. The dissent also placed greater weight on the position of the Executive Branch than did
the majority. Drawing from an amicus curiae brief filed by the Solicitor General in a similar case, the
dissent concluded that the government's position stated in the brief served as a substitute for a "clear
federal directive" that the Federal Government was to speak with one voice. Id. at 204-05 & n.8.377See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), and O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in
International Law Decisions in National Courts 14 (T. Franck & G. Fox eds. 1996) (quoting Justice
Jackson in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).378Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941).379United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (grounding its decision on the belief that "[tlhis
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navigable waters, it retained for the federal government "paramount" rights
in those waters for the purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense,
and international affairs.380
The Foreign Affairs Clause may operate to limit state authority over
foreign merchant vessels even where no established federal law controls if,
in the exercise of its federal affairs powers, the national government accords
privileges or favorable treatment to the vessels's flag State under the
principle of international comity. Justice Sutherland, dissenting in Cunard
S.S. Co. v. Mellon,381 warned that the Court's decision in that case upholding
application of the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act to foreign
vessels voluntarily in United States ports violated "the principles of
international comity, which exist between friendly nations." Similarly, in
their dissent in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, Justices Kennedy and
Thomas highlighted the principle of comity among nations as an objective
that goes to the "vital center of the admiralty pre-emption doctrine." 382 They
pointed out that "[c]omity with other nations and among the States was a
primary aim of the Constitution. At the time of the framing, it was essential
that our prospective trading partners would know that the United States
would uphold its treaties, respect the general maritime law, and refrain from
erecting barriers from commerce." 383 As will be discussed in Part II of this
article, international comity and the desire to obtain favorable treatment for
United States vessels on a reciprocal basis is a key factor in the United
States's decision to accede to international standards for merchant vessels
and to the limited port State control regime embodied in a number of
international conventions.
country, throughout its existence, has stood for freedom of the seas, a principle whose breach has
precipitated war among nations.").
38°Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1314.
"8'262 U.S. 100 (1923).
382510 U.S. 443, 466, 1994 AMC 913 (1994) (Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (citations
omitted).3831d.
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